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Articles
Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a
Model for Breaking Up the Banks That Are
Too-Big-to-Fail?
Roberta S. Karmel*
During the financial crisis of 2007–08 and the debates on regulatory reform that followed,
there was general agreement that the “too-big-to-fail” principle creates unacceptable
moral hazard. Policy makers divided, however, on the solutions to this problem. Some
argued that the banking behemoths in the United States should be broken up. Others
argued that dismantling the big banks would be bad policy because these banks would
not be able to compete with universal banks in the global capital markets, and in any
event, breaking up the banks would be impossible as a practical matter. Therefore, better
regulation was the right solution. This approach was generally followed in the financial
reform legislation that was passed.
In the past, the United States has taken a variety of approaches to reining in banks. These
include capital constraints, geographical restrictions, activities restrictions and conflict of
interest restrictions. The primary techniques for reining in big banks recently enacted by
Congress were increasing capital requirements, walling off proprietary trading and/or
derivatives trading from commercial banking, and creating a resolution regime for failed
financial institutions.
One approach that has not been tried or even seriously discussed with regard to the big
banks is the approach that was used to break up the utility pyramids created during the
1920s, that is the antitrust approach utilized in the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935. This targeted and highly effective regulatory framework empowered the
Securities and Exchange Commission to dismantle and simplify the corporate structures
of the utilities without destroying them. This Article argues that this approach should be
considered as a solution to the too-big-to-fail problem since it combines deconcentration,
capital limits, activities restrictions and conflict of interest restrictions as an alternative to
antitrust regulation, outside of adversarial prosecutorial case development.

* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor and Co-Director of the Dennis J. Block Center for
the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She is a former Commissioner of
the Securities and Exchange Commission. The research assistance of Brooklyn Law School students
Boris Brownstein, Katherine Stefanou, and Irene Tan is acknowledged and greatly appreciated. A
summer research grant from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance in writing this Article.
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Introduction
During the financial crisis of 2007–08 and the debates on regulatory
reform that followed, there was general agreement that the “too-big-tofail” principle creates unacceptable moral hazard. This principle is based
on the belief that “certain institutions are so large or so complex that the
government will intervene and prevent their failure by protecting
uninsured creditors from their losses due to the perceived systemic risk
1
presented by the organization’s failure.” Policymakers divided, however,
on the solution to this problem. Some argued that the banking
behemoths in the United States should be broken up. Others argued that
dismantling the big banks would be bad policy, because these banks
would not be able to compete with universal banks in the global capital
markets, and in any event, breaking up the banks would be impossible as
2
a practical matter. Instead, better regulation was the right solution. The
key policymakers in the Obama administration believed in better
regulation rather than in breaking up the banks. Therefore, an improved
1. Yomarie Silva, The “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine and the Credit Crisis, 28 Rev. Banking & Fin.
L. 1, 115–16 (2009).
2. David Wessel, The “Too Big” Divide on Banks, Wall St. J., June 10, 2010, at A2.
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regulatory approach was generally followed in the Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) passed by
3
Congress. Yet, voices in favor of a return to the wall between
commercial and investment banking of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
4
(“Glass-Steagall”), or using some other technique for curtailing risky
bank activities, continue to be heard and studied. Thus, further inquiry
concerning the question of whether the big financial institutions should
be curtailed remains relevant.
Financial intermediation transforms savings into investments, prices
and adds liquidity to those investments, and spreads financial risk. At
one time, financial institutions engaged in these tasks were segmented.
Commercial banks accepted deposits, both demand and time, and made
commercial and personal loans and acted as underwriters of U.S.
government and municipal debt. They also engaged in a variety of
permitted ancillary services, such as estate and trust services and the
advising of trust accounts, acceptances and letters of credit, and
5
management of the payments system. Savings and loan associations
(“S&Ls”) or thrifts accepted savings deposits and were engaged in
6
extending mortgage loans. Broker-dealers and investment banks acted
as underwriters for corporate and municipal issuers, advised customers
on securities purchases, mergers and acquisitions and other transactions,
7
and acted as agents and dealers in securities. There were no financial
8
futures or dealing in derivatives until 1975; commodities trading was

3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
4. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)),
repealed in part by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
5. Commercial banks have continuously engaged in these kinds of activities, as well as some
securities activities, depending on the legislative and economic climate at the time. See Thomas G.
Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
51 Tenn. L. Rev. 467, 468–69 (1984). As Congress eased restrictions on commercial banks, it sought to
allow commercial banks to operate on an even footing with investment banks, particularly with regard
to underwriting activities. Christian A. Johnson, Holding Credit Hostage for Underwriting Ransom:
Rethinking Bank Antitying Rules, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 157, 159–60, 167–69 (2002); see also United States
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326–27 n.5 (1963) (noting the principal banking products for
commercial banks).
6. See James Ring Adams, The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal 21–22 (Karl Weber ed., 1990);
see also Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Fail—Too Small to Compete: Systematic Risk Should Be
Addressed Through Antitrust Law but Such a Solution Will Only Work If It Is Applied on an
International Basis, 22 Fla. J. Int’l L. 31, 36–38 (2010). The restrictions on S&Ls were lifted by
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73, § 208,
103 Stat. 193, 211 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2006)).
7. See Samuel L. Hayes III & Philip M. Hubbard, Investment Banking: The Tale of Three
Cities 68–69, 98–112 (1990).
8. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized
Financial Regulatory Structure 46 (2008) [hereinafter Blueprint] (“In 1975, the [Commodity
Futures Trading Commission], with its new authority over futures markets, approved the first futures
contracts on financial assets, including the Chicago Board of Trade’s futures contract on Government
National Mortgage Association certificates, and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s futures contract
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confined to agricultural futures traded on exchanges. Investment
management was a shared activity among insurance companies, mutual
funds, and individually advised clients.
Because financial intermediation was reasonably separated, and
because the United States regulated banking, securities issuances, and
insurance on a state level before federal regulation of financial firms
came into existence, the United States developed functional regulation of
financial institutions and products. Functional regulation led to the
creation of numerous financial regulators, each with a stake in
10
maintaining such regulation. Regulated industries also had a stake in
11
functional regulation.
This regulatory system was challenged by a number of economic
and technological developments, starting in the 1960s, accelerating in the
1980s, and coming to a crashing conclusion in the first decade of the
twenty-first century. Because President Nixon did not want to devalue
the dollar during the first oil shock, fixed exchange rates were abandoned
12
for a floating exchange rate system. Nevertheless, inflation inevitably
eroded the value of the dollar and also the fixed interest rate ceilings that
13
had supported the profitability of commercial banking. The invention

on 90-day U.S. Treasury bills.”).
9. See Blueprint, supra note 8, at 11.
10. The United States has had a system of functional regulation with numerous federal and state
regulators for financial organizations, whereas other countries have a single regulator of twin- or
three-peaks regulation. See id. at 139–44. The head of the trade group for the securities industry urged
a three-peaks solution to the U.S. regulatory order when financial reform was under consideration in
2008. See Regulatory Restructuring and Reform of the Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 51–54 (2008) (statement of T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., President & Chief Exec.
Officer of the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n).
11. The theory that regulatory competition resulted in regulatory efficiency justified the
deregulation that prevailed from 1980 to 2008. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2385, 2394 (1998); Shelley Thompson,
The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on Investor Protection, 41 Int’l Law. 1121, 1123
(2007). Some scholars demurred. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities
Law: A Dream (That Should Be) Deferred, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 1155, 1156–57 (2005). This theory was one
of the factors that enabled regulatory industries to capture the congressional committees that had
oversight over the federal financial agencies, not only through the mechanism of campaign
contributions, but ideologically. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street
Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown 92–97 (2010).
12. Deficits due to the Vietnam War as well as the rising power of OPEC contributed to a dollar
devaluation and currency instabilities. See Henry Kaufman, Interest Rates, the Markets, and the
New Financial World 87–88, 93–94, 189 (1986). During the 1970s and early 1980s, a number of large
corporate and bank failures threatened the financial system and should have served as an early
warning of problems within the U.S. and international financial regulatory systems. See id. at 5, 94.
Bailouts of Chrysler and Continental Illinois Bank (“Continental Illinois”) led to the too-big-to-fail
doctrine. See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
13. Until 1980, the rate of interest that depository institutions could pay on deposits was fixed.
Beginning in 1980, interest rate limitations were eliminated, and by 1986, they were completely
removed. See 12 U.S.C. § 3501–09 (Supp. V 1980), repealed by Depository Institutions Deregulation
Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 142. The connection between interest rate deregulation and
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and growth of financial derivatives was one reaction to the unfixing of
exchange rates. The instability injected into the financial system
transformed financial intermediation from a business that turned savings
into investments and then packaged those investments into loans and
liquid securities, to a business that priced and traded risks. A tremendous
growth in the amount of savings under private management led to the
14
divorce of savers from investment decisionmaking and gave institutional
investors great power over investment banks and securities exchanges.
This power, coupled with technological advances, led to the unfixing of
stock exchange commission rates that had supported the profitability of
securities firms. Financial intermediaries profit from inefficiencies and
anomalies in the process of intermediation. Computerization of financial
services greatly reduced the costs of intermediation, with respect to
banking and investment banking services and securities trading, and
banks and securities firms were no longer protected by governmentsanctioned price fixing for their services.
Changes in the American and global economies also threatened the
U.S. financial regulatory model. Although the dollar remained the
reserve currency, it began to be challenged by the Euro and other
currencies. Also, commodity prices, especially oil and real estate, became
significant measures of valuation. The U.S. budget and trade deficits and
a floating rate currency regime injected risks into the financial system
that contributed to the growth and further development of financial
futures. By the late 1980s, derivatives had become the pricing mechanism
for securities trading. This became apparent at the time of the stock
15
market crash of 1987. The dominance of derivatives injected further
leverage and speculation into the capital markets, completely
undermining the margin rules passed in the 1930s to limit leverage and
16
speculation in the securities markets. It also became apparent that in
view of the changes in financial intermediation, old fashioned banking,
investment banking, and securities trading were no longer viable.
Further, the United States was overbanked. Thousands of banks and
securities firms failed due to the combination of global competition, the
financial firms’ inability to compete in the changed world of competitive

further bank deregulation is drawn in Taking Account: Banking Deregulation Benefits Many People
but Stirs Some Worry, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 1.
14. See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment
Management Treatises, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 564–65 (1981) (reviewing Tamar Frankel, The
Regulation of Money Managers (1980) and Harvey E. Bines, The Law of Investment
Management (1978)).
15. See Presidential Task Force on Mkt. Mechanisms, Report of The Presidential Task
Force on Market Mechanisms, at vi (1988); see also Div. of Mkt. Regulation, Sec. Exch. Comm’n,
The October 1987 Market Break, at 3-6 to 3-9 (1988) [hereinafter 1987 Market Break].
16. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of the Securities and Exchange Commission as a Market
Regulator, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 501, 516–17 (2009).
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interest and commission rates, and the efficiencies wrought by
computerization of financial intermediation and global competition.
Because of the existence of deposit insurance and the need to protect the
deposit insurance fund of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
17
(“FDIC”), regulators were incentivized to prevent financial institutions’
failures. As a result, the too-big-to-fail doctrine developed in the 1980s:
Mega-banks and financial supermarkets came into existence, because
apparently sound institutions were willing to acquire failing institutions,
18
especially if they could thus avoid regulatory restrictions. Banks pushed
to get into securities trading and investment banking, and securities firms
pushed to get into banking. Their regulators, Congress and the courts, all
participated in dismantling the regulatory system that had held these
businesses in separate compartments, but did not put any new regulatory
system in place. Dodd-Frank also does not put any new regulatory
system in place, but rather attempts to modify and reform the existing
system. Moreover, this legislation gives expanded authority to the same
regulators who failed to prevent the crisis of 2008. Furthermore, these
regulators are now confronted by financial institutions that are
behemoths and are extremely difficult to regulate or even to understand.
Yet, they exert great economic and political power.
In the past, the United States has taken a variety of approaches to
reining in banks. These include capital constraints, geographical
19
restrictions, activities restrictions, and conflict of interest restrictions.
None of these restrictions were able to withstand the end of the Bretton
Woods Agreement, the unfixing of interest rate restrictions for banks
and stock exchange fixed commissions, the invention of financial futures,
the globalization of the capital markets, and perhaps most importantly,
computerization of financial information. Furthermore, as Congress
engaged in the deregulation of banking, from approximately 1980 to

17. Federal deposit insurance was created in 1933 as a result of the numerous bank failures after
the 1929 stock market crash. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, ch. 89, sec. 8, § 12B, 48
Stat. 168 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 263 (2006)).
18. When there was a run on Continental Illinois after the failure of Penn Square Bank (“Penn
Square”) because Continental Illinois had purchased $1 billion in oil and gas exploration loans from
Penn Square, the FDIC committed $4.5 billion from its insurance fund, and the Fed agreed to lend the
bank an additional $3.6 billion. Laurie S. Goodman & Sherrill Shaffer, The Economics of Deposit
Insurance: A Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms, 2 Yale J. on Reg. 145, 151 n.31 (1984). The
FDIC was unable to find a merger partner, and so it announced it would purchase problem loans from
the bank. Id. The FDIC then made a finding of “essentiality” and provided a $2 billion subordinated
loan to the bank, becoming an 80% owner. Tim Carrington, U.S. Won’t Let 11 Biggest Banks in Nation
Fail—Testimony by Comptroller at House Hearing Is First Policy Acknowledgment, Wall St. J., Sept.
20, 1984, at 2. New managers and directors were then appointed. Id. In connection with these events,
the Comptroller of the Currency told Congress that the federal government would not “allow any of
the nation’s 11 largest banks to fail.” Id. Committee members retorted that he had created a new
category of bank—the too-big-to-fail bank. Id.
19. See infra Part I.
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1999, culminating in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“Gramm-Leach20
Bliley”), it did not create a new regulatory regime for banking,
21
investment banking, and securities and commodities trading.
Additionally, due to Dodd-Frank, functional regulation remains, enabling
different agencies with different approaches to continue regulating
financial institutions and markets. The largest financial institutions have
grown even larger than before, increasing the risks and costs of their
failure. While some in Congress believe they have outlawed too-big-tofail, the size and connectivity of the largest financial institutions probably
make this a vain hope.
The primary techniques for reining in big banks considered by
Congress or financial regulators in current regulatory reform efforts
22
23
include increasing capital requirements, taxing financial transactions,
and walling off proprietary trading and/or derivatives trading from
24
commercial banking. In addition, the Dodd-Frank legislation puts into
25
place a resolution regime for failed financial institutions. Increased
capital requirements will undoubtedly be imposed, not only in the
26
United States, but globally. Some activities restrictions may also survive
as regulatory options, but derivatives trading is being dealt with primarily
through increased regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”), and the extent to which this new regulation will
dampen derivatives trading is uncertain.
One approach that has not been tried or even seriously discussed
with regard to the big banks is the approach that was used to break up
the utility pyramids created during the 1920s: that is, the antitrust
approach utilized in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
27
(“PUHCA”). This targeted and highly effective regulatory framework
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to dismantle
and simplify the corporate structures of the utilities without destroying
them. This program was so successful that even after it was essentially
completed, the statute and SEC regulation of utilities remained on the
books until quite recently. This Article will argue that this approach
20. Also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113
Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
23. This idea collapsed before it was even fully developed. See Francesco Guerrera et al., A Line
Is Drawn, Fin. Times, July 1, 2010, at 9.
24. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
25. Tit. VII, 124 Stat. at 1641–1802.
26. See Damian Paletta & David Enrich, Banks Get New Restraints Historic: Refashioning of
Rules Aims to Trim Risk-Taking, Limit Future Crises, Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 2010, at A1; see also
Declaration, G-20, Toronto Summit 16 (June 26–27, 2010), available at www.g20.org/Documents/
g-20_declaration_en.pdf.
27. Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79 to 79(z)-6 (2000)), repealed
by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 (2005).

Karmel_62-HLJ-821 (Do Not Delete)

828

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

4/16/2011 1:08 PM

[Vol. 62:821

should be considered as a solution to the too-big-to-fail policy, because it
combines deconcentration, capital limits, activities restrictions, and
conflict of interest restrictions as an alternative to antitrust regulation,
outside of adversarial prosecutorial case development. Although some
antitrust actions aimed at breaking up monopoly power have succeeded
28
29
in restructuring an industry, other actions have failed, and the
Department of Justice has not been especially successful in prosecuting
30
cases against the banking and securities industries.
Part I of this Article will summarize the demise of geographical and
activities restrictions on U.S. banks that culminated in the enactment of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999. This Part will also explain why a return to
Glass-Steagall is a nice idea but impractical if not impossible. Among
other reasons, securitization has turned all commercial banks into
securities firms, and the largest investment banks have become bank
holding companies. Part II will set forth how deregulation of banking,
against the backdrop of the continuing failure of banks and thrifts,
contributed to the growth of large financial supermarkets. Part III will
explore the extent to which the PUHCA is a possible model for dealing
with the excesses of the mega-financial institutions. The Article will then
conclude.
In a global capital market economy, the United States is not as free
as it once was to go its own way in financial regulation. Not only are U.S.
banks in competition with European, Asian, and other banks, but the
United States is a key member of the G-20 and other organizations that
are creating new paradigms for financial regulation in response to the
financial crisis. Therefore, the views, laws, and policies of other key
jurisdictions will affect the path of U.S. financial regulation and
regulatory reform. Nevertheless, the United States has a different history
and tradition with regard to bank regulation than many other countries.
The First Bank of the United States, the first federal central bank, was
31
controversial and was destroyed by Andrew Jackson, not to be
32
resurrected until 1913. Banks have long been demonized by populists,
and politicians have opted for weak banks and cheap money during

28. See e.g., United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 64,900 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1982)
(consent decree ending ongoing AT&T antitrust litigation). For an additional discussion, see Thomas
E. Kauper, Notable Antitrust Cases: The AT&T Case: A Personal View, 5 Competition Pol’y Int’l 253
(2009).
29. Nathan Koppel, Justice Department Launches Antitrust Investigation of IBM, WSJ Law Blog
(Oct. 8, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/08/justice-department-launches-antitrustinvestigation-of-ibm/.
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; infra note 143 and accompanying text.
31. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 19–22.
32. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522
(2006)).
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33

many periods of American history. The Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”)
has been tarnished by its failure to prevent the financial meltdown of
2008, and while it has maintained and even increased its powers in the
2010 financial reform, it is probably less independent than before.
Therefore, although the United States is not the economic hegemon it
was after World War II, and although the global regulators may choose
to do so, Americans may not decide to embrace an all-powerful central
bank regulator and a corresponding oligopoly of money center banks.

I. The Regulation and Deregulation of Banking: 1933–1999
Between 1933 and 1999, banks were subject to geographical and
activities restrictions that were gradually eroded by regulatory fiat and
Congressional action and inaction. By the end of the twentieth century,
U.S. banks were allowed to operate as universal banks. Dodd-Frank did
not reverse this development.
A. Geographical Restrictions
Some of the important restrictions on banks designed to prevent
excessive concentration of financial power were the prohibitions against
branching interstate and intrastate. These restrictions were based on a
desire to control banks on a community level, to have and encourage
close relationships between bankers and borrowers within those
34
communities, and to avoid centralized financial power. These
35
restrictions were also utilized to limit competition. When the federal
banking system was established in 1864, the National Bank Act allowed
banks to be either chartered as a state or as a national bank, but national
36
banks were not permitted to branch. Then, in the 1900s, states began
granting branching powers to state-chartered banks, giving state banks a
competitive edge over national banks. In 1927, Congress authorized
national banks to open a limited number of branches in local
communities if the law of that state permitted state-chartered banks to
do so, and by way of a 1933 amendment, provided national banks with
full equality to branch throughout their home states to the same extent
37
the states permitted their own banks to branch. The effect of this

33. See generally Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of
American Corporate Finance (1994).
34. Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. Legis. 255, 255–56 (1995).
35. See George Melloan, The Efficiency Argument for Banking Reform, Wall St. J., Dec. 29,
1987, at 15.
36. See National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864); see also First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v.
Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 648–49 (1924).
37. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(2006)); Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 257.
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deference to state regulators was to prevent out-of-state banks from
opening branches, with the result that weak banks were propped up and
38
the country became over-banked. Some states also prevented branching
intrastate. For example, a provision to this effect was in the Illinois
Constitution from 1870 to 1993, preventing the Chicago money center
39
banks from branching into city, suburban, and downstate neighborhoods.
In the 1940s and 1950s, banks formed bank holding companies as a
device to circumvent the restrictions on interstate and intrastate
branching. The holding company structure allowed a bank to effectively
create a branch in different states or communities even though branching
40
was not allowed. The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding
41
Company Act of 1956 partially closed this end-run around geographic
restrictions by prohibiting a bank holding company from acquiring an
interstate bank unless there was explicit statutory authorization by the
42
state where the bank to be acquired was located.
In the 1970s, American banks complained that foreign banks
operating in the United States had a competitive advantage, because
43
they were not restricted by the McFadden Act and therefore could
44
establish interstate branches easily. In response, Congress passed the
International Banking Act of 1978, restricting foreign bank branching in
the United States, and also establishing federal rules to govern those
45
foreign bank operations. After Ronald Reagan became President, the
Department of the Treasury issued a report to Congress criticizing the
46
McFadden Act as “ineffective, inequitable, inefficient and anachronistic.”

38. See Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. Banking Inst. 221,
234 (2000).
39. Illinois Bank Branching History, Ill. Dep’t of Fin. and Prof’l Regulation,
http://www.obre.state.il.us/cbt/STATS/br-hist.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). For a brief discussion of
how the constraints on branching in Illinois may have led to the collapse of Continental Illinois, see
Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age,
57 Fordham L. Rev. 501, 507–08 n.24 (1989); Goodman & Shaffer, supra note 18, at 151 n.33; Joseph
Silvia, Efficiency and Effectiveness in Securities Regulation: Comparative Analysis of the United States’s
Competitive Regulatory Structure and the United Kingdom’s Single-Regulator Model, 6 DePaul Bus. &
Com. L.J. 247, 260–61 (2008).
40. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 257.
41. Ch. 240, sec. 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)
(1994)), repealed in part by Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1942(d) (2006)).
42. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 258. As some states recognized the benefits holding
companies offered in terms of attracting new investment capital to their states, this restriction slowly
eroded, but in some cases was limited by reciprocity requirements. Id.
43. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)).
44. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 259.
45. Pub. L. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3111 (2006)).
46. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Restrictions on Commercial Banking in the United
States: The Report of the President 17 (1981).
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Although Congress did not respond to this criticism for another
decade, the banking industry was able to persuade some states to move
to regional compacts permitting interstate branching. Such compacts
were upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that the legislative
history of the Douglas Amendment contemplated that some states might
partially lift the ban on interstate banking but not open up to banking
47
from all states. In addition, banks began to introduce automated teller
machines (“ATMs”) as a way to expand their operations. At first, some
courts held that ATMs were branches, but when the Comptroller of the
Currency ruled that shared ATMs were not subject to the McFadden
48
Act’s branching limitations, ATMs spread across the country.
In the early 1990s, Congress finally ended branching restrictions by
passing the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
49
of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal”). A number of reasons were given for the
statute, including a concern that the geographic banking restrictions
hindered the competitiveness of the U.S. banking industry, the view that
interstate branching would promote diversification of bank assets and
50
loan portfolios, and greater customer convenience and choice. The Act
allowed bank holding companies to acquire separate banks in multiple
states as long as the Fed found the holding company adequately
51
capitalized and managed. Riegle-Neal also authorized the Comptroller
of the Currency to approve the establishment and operation of interstate
52
national bank branches, and the FDIC to approve interstate branches of
53
insured state nonmember banks.
The geographic restrictions on banking did prevent concentration of
banking in the United States, and, in fact, resulted in the opposite
problem—too many uncompetitive banks that failed when they were
forced by economic and technological developments and deregulation to
compete with bigger and better capitalized banking and other financial
institutions. Furthermore, with the advent of the Internet and national

47. Ne. Bancorp., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 168–69, 172
(1985).
48. Markham, supra note 38, at 249 nn.181–82. Nevertheless, the Comptroller’s ruling was
challenged in a case in the D.C. Circuit that held that ATMs were branches within the meaning of the
National Bank Act. Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). The Comptroller was then forced to reverse his position that ATMs were
not branches. See Customer Bank Communication Terminals, 41 Fed. Reg. 48,333 (Nov. 3, 1976). This
did not stop the spread of ATMs. About 50,000 ATMs were operating in the United States in 1983,
and by 1996, there were 120,000. Markham, supra note 38, at 249 & n.182.
49. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles
of U.S.C. (2006)).
50. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 266–67, 269.
51. Stacey Stritzel, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994:
Progress Toward a New Era in Financial Services Regulation, 46 Syracuse L. Rev. 161, 174–79 (1995).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2006).
53. Id. § 1828(d)(4).
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connectivity via new technologies, it would be wholly unrealistic to
attempt to contain the size of banks and other financial institutions
through geographical limitations.
B. Activities and Conflict of Interest Restrictions
Banks traditionally performed three functions of value to the
economy. They accepted deposits for savings and trust funds, and also
for liquid assets; they acted as payments intermediaries for both
consumers and businesses; and, they channeled deposits into the credit
54
markets to meet the needs of businesses and consumers. Because of the
importance of maintaining depositor confidence in banks, banks have
enjoyed special governmental privileges, including federal deposit
insurance since 1933, and they have also been subject to regulation.
Among other things, Congress has endeavored to minimize the exposure
of banks to risk, to prevent major commercial banks from concentrating
financial power, and to prevent banks from becoming entangled in
55
conflicts of interest. The thrust of federal bank regulation has been
aimed at maintaining the safety and soundness of banks through capital
controls, activities restrictions, and conflict of interest prohibitions.
Activities restrictions and conflict of interest prohibitions are closely
related. When banks engage in activities that involve conflicts of interest,
they undermine their safety and soundness. Likewise, if banks engage in
lines of business that are unnecessary to effective banking, they
56
undertake needless risks.
Therefore, only regulators determined banks’ ability to engage in
activities incidental to banking. S&Ls were more circumscribed than
banks, but when Congress passed the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which phased out
57
interest rate caps on commercial banks and S&Ls, it also deregulated
the activities restrictions on S&Ls so that they could generally compete
with commercial banks and also invest up to 20% of their assets in
58
commercial real estate loans. Further, they were allowed to sell their
59
mortgage loans and use the proceeds to seek better returns. This

54. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System: The Policy Basis for
Continued Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking, 35 Am. U. L. Rev. 647, 653–54 (1986).
55. Note, National Banks and the Brokerage Business: The Comptroller’s New Reading of the
Glass-Steagall Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1303, 1335 (1983).
56. Id. at 1336–37.
57. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 401(c)(2)(A), 94 Stat. 142 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C. (2006)).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 401(c)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(A) (2006)). Removing the
cap on interest that S&Ls could pay depositors, but taking no action to change the fixed long-term
mortgage rates—generally capped by state usury laws that were much less than the rate of inflation—
was a recipe for widespread bankruptcies by S&Ls. Trying to fix this problem by allowing S&Ls to
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deregulation led to the failure of numerous S&Ls. Commercial bank and
S&L failures between 1980 and 1994 were somewhere between 1300 and
60
1600. The taxpayer bailout of these failed institutions may have cost as
61
much as $300 billion.
The most important activities and conflict of interest restrictions for
purposes of this Article were those in Glass-Steagall, which was passed in
1933 as an important part of the New Deal effort to restore public
62
confidence in the country’s financial system. It was linked with the
passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which provided federal
63
insurance for retail bank accounts. Glass-Steagall was passed to prevent
banks from exploiting conflicts of interest in certain activities,
specifically: making loans to corporations for which the bank or its
affiliates had underwritten securities, selling securities to trust accounts,
64
and giving investment advice to bank managed accounts.
This legislation had two types of provisions separating investment
and commercial banking. Direct combinations were regulated under
section 16 of Glass-Steagall, which prohibited national banks and state
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System from
purchasing, underwriting, or dealing in securities, except as provided in
65
the Act. Section 21 prohibited institutions involved in underwriting,
66
selling, or distributing securities from also taking deposits. The second
type of provision prevented indirect combinations. Section 20 prohibited
Federal Reserve System member banks from being affiliated with any
organization engaged in the issuance, underwriting, public sale, or
67
distribution of non-exempt securities. Section 32 prohibited Federal
Reserve and state member banks from sharing personnel with entities
primarily engaged in the issuance, underwriting, public sale, or
68
distribution of securities. The policy of restricting bank activities was

engage in risky real estate ventures clearly made matters even worse.
60. Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of
Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 595, 636 (1999). Several of the
factors accounting for the large number of failures included an increase in competition from within the
banking industry and non-bank competitors that led banks to participate in more speculative activities,
deregulation in the early 1980s, regional recessions—especially given the fact that geographic banking
restrictions were still in place—and management inattention and misconduct. Id.
61. See Adams, supra note 6, at 17, 279; see also Richard W. Stevenson, G.A.O. Puts Cost of
S.&L. Bailout at Half a Trillion Dollars, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1996, at 34.
62. Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated
Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 Brook. L. Rev. 1295, 1298 (1995).
63. See supra note 17.
64. Di Lorenzo, supra note 54, at 677.
65. Ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162, 185 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006)).
66. Id. § 21 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2006)).
67. Id. § 20 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994) (repealed 1999)).
68. Id. § 32 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994) (repealed 1999)).
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further developed in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which
gave the Fed the power to pass upon new business activities by large
banks. Under section 4(c)(6) of that statute, nonbank subsidiaries of
bank holding companies were permitted to engage in activities the Fed
found to be closely related to banking and, therefore, “a proper incident
70
thereto.” Similar regulatory approvals by the Office of the Comptroller
71
of the Currency (“OCC”) enforced Glass-Steagall as to national banks.
This was not a complete separation of banking and securities activities,
since banks were allowed to underwrite and deal in U.S. government and
72
municipal bonds.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the bank regulators and Congress
engaged in a general deregulation of banking that over time, permitted
banks, and especially large money center banks, to engage in most
aspects of the securities business. This story has been told by others and
73
will not be repeated here. In addition, securities firms pushed into
banking by establishing money market funds and cash management
74
accounts and buying “nonbank banks.” Many of these activities could
only be conducted in separate subsidiaries, and so this reintegration of
the banking and securities businesses occurred in financial holding
75
companies. This suited the SEC and the bank regulators, since they
were able to maintain jurisdiction over the entities they had traditionally
regulated through the mechanism of functional regulation. Unfortunately,
functional regulation meant that no financial regulator had a complete
picture of financial institution holding companies or the power to curtail
their activities in subsidiaries not regulated by their primary regulator, or
76
in many cases, by any regulator.

69. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1850 (2006)).
70. Id. § 4(c)(6) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)); see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Clarke, 865
F.2d 278, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
71. See, e.g., First Tennessee Bank, 1999-WO-08-0015, Conditional Approval No. 351 (Comp.
Currency Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/feb00/
ca351.pdf; Zions First National Bank, 97-WO-08-0003, Conditional Approval No. 262 (Comp.
Currency Dec. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Zions First National], available at http://www.occ.gov/static/
interpretations-and-precedents/dec97/ca262.pdf.
72. Zions First National Bank, supra note 71.
73. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 6, at 39–48; Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services
Industry Puts Together Let No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to
the 2008–2009 American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 Alb. L. Rev. 371, 399 (2010); Markham, supra note
38, at 250–52; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215, 312–13, 316; see
also Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 441, 468 n.172
(1998).
74. See David M. Eaton, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of Investment Banks and
Other Nonbanks, 44 Emory L.J. 1187, 1200–13 (1995).
75. See id. at 1200–02.
76. See Markham, supra note 38, at 264.
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Two additional developments changed the nature of the banking
and securities industry and injected enormous risks into the capital
markets: the development and growth of derivatives and securitization.
Financial futures began to be traded on the Chicago Mercantile
77
Exchange in 1975. The Fed approved J.P. Morgan & Co.’s application
to create a “futures commission merchant” in 1982. The business of this
subsidiary was to deal in bullion and foreign exchange, U.S. government
78
securities, money market instruments and Eurodollar CDs. One side
effect of this development, which seemed innocuous enough at the time,
was that yet another functional regulator—the CFTC—was added to the
79
mix of federal regulators of banks. The second important development
was the widespread use of securitization to transform loans by banks and
80
other financial institutions into liquid, asset backed securities.
Congress finally blessed the financial supermarket concept that the
financial services industry had already created with the permission of
their financial regulators, and the cooperation of the courts, when it
81
passed Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999, repealing Glass-Steagall. From at
least two perspectives, the financial meltdown of 2008 can be blamed on
the repeal of Glass-Steagall. First, the immediate cause of the meltdown
was the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, which had been
propelled by the widespread securitization of real estate loans and the
change of the banking business from an “originate to hold” model to an
“originate to distribute” model of financing mortgages and other
82
consumer loans. Second, in Gramm-Leach-Bliley and subsequently, in
83
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Congress not only
failed to construct a regulatory system to match the permitted
commingling of banking and securities, but it specifically prohibited any
regulatory agency from controlling the growth of certain derivatives
84
transactions. Therefore, excessive leverage and risk were injected into
the financial system.

77. CFTC History in the 1970s, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, http://www.cftc.gov/
About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_1970s.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
78. See Markham, supra note 38, at 252.
79. See id.
80. Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product
Development, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1553, 1557–58 (2008); see also Wilmarth, supra note 73, at 389.
81. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.).
82. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 76–77; see also Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk
Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1327,
1329–30 (2009).
83. Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
84. Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 136–37 (discussing the passage of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act and the driving forces behind it); see Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the
Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 Ind. L.J. 777, 793–96 (2010) (addressing the
passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the failed attempt at a comprehensive regulatory system for the
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Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Glass-Steagall can be resurrected in
the form in which it previously existed. The banking and securities
businesses are very different from what they were in 1933. Securitization
85
has transformed all bank loans into securities. Investment firms own
banks, and market and manage money market funds that function like
86
bank accounts. Yet, the same conflict-of-interest problems remain and
such conflicts still lead to dangerous risk-taking. The current reincarnation
of a Glass-Steagall wall between deposit-taking institutions and the
conflicts and risks inherent in the securities business have come in the
form of the Volcker Rule, as proposed by the Department of the
Treasury and included in the original Senate version of Dodd-Frank. The
Volker Rule was seriously compromised in the final form of the Act:
This Rule, essentially, would have prohibited any banking entity from
engaging in proprietary trading, or sponsoring or investing in a hedge
87
fund or private equity fund. Lobbyists injected numerous big exceptions
to the Rule, including transactions on behalf of customers, and wide
discretion is given to financial regulators to permit activities in
88
derogation of the Rule. Yet, limits on permitted activities demonstrate
the Rule’s fundamental purpose. These limits are that no transaction
may be permitted if it would involve or result in a material conflict of
interest, result in a material exposure to high risk assets or high risk
trading strategies, pose a threat to the safety and soundness of the

commingling of banking and securities); see also Carol A. Needham, Listening to Cassandra: The
Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and Taking Action, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2329, 2331 (2010).
85. See Wilmarth, supra note 73, at 230–31.
86. See Group of Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability 29 (2009)
(recommending money market funds be regulated as banks). During the financial meltdown, when the
Reserve Fund “[broke] the buck,” the Treasury provided insurance akin to deposit insurance on
money market fund accounts. See Joseph R. Fleming et al., The Future of Money Market Funds:
Implications of the Recent Turmoil, 42 Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. 107, 108 (2009).
87. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, secs. 619, 621, §§ 13, 27B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–32
(2010) (amending the Bank Holding Company Act by adding new section 13, and the Securities Act of
1933 by adding new section 27B).
88. Id. The exceptions to the Volcker Rule, identified in section 619 of the Act, id. sec. 619,
§ 13(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 1623–26, and which apply to all covered banking entities, are as follows: First, a
range of U.S. government securities and state government obligations are excluded from the definition
of covered instruments. Id. § 13(d)(1)(A). Second, transactions that are made in connection with
underwriting or market-making related activities, to the extent those activities are not designed to
exceed the reasonably expected demands of clients, customers or counterparties, are exempt. Id.
§ 13(d)(1)(B). The third exception is for risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with
individual or aggregated holdings of the covered banking entity. Id. § 13(d)(1)(C). The fourth
exception is for transactions on behalf of customers. Id. § 13(d)(1)(D). There is also an exception for
regulated insurance companies and their affiliates that make investments for the general account of
the insurance company in accordance with state law, id. § 13(d)(1)(F), and one permitting a covered
banking entity to trade solely outside the United States as long as it is not directly or indirectly owned
or controlled by a covered banking entity organized under the laws of United States or any of the
states. Id. § 13(d)(1)(H).
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banking entity, or pose a threat to U.S. financial stability. The past
conduct of financial regulators in bowing to the interests of banks and
allowing them to undermine and then completely destroy Glass-Steagall
suggests that the Volcker Rule, already watered down, will not be
rigorously applied over time. The largest banks are simply too big and
too powerful to be constrained. The questions posed by this Article are
whether they need to be dismantled, and if so, how can such
deconcentration be accomplished.

II. Bank Failures, Deregulation, and the Growth of
Financial Supermarkets
The deregulation of stock exchange commission rates and bank
interest rates led to the failure of many broker-dealers, S&Ls, and banks.
Before 1980, the FDIC reported approximately six bank closures
90
91
annually. In 1981, the number increased to ten. During the 1980s, bank
failures and consolidations occurred at a record level, and the too-big-to92
fail doctrine was born. By the end of the 1980s, 200 banks annually were
93
forced to close. By 1991, the FDIC had paid approximately $11.8 billion
to protect depositors in the fourteen failures of banks with assets over $1
94
billion.
95
In order to protect the federal deposit insurance fund and similar
96
97
guarantee funds for securities firms and S&Ls, financial regulators

89. Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(2).
90. Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 Bus. Law.
907, 908 (1989).
91. Id.
92. See id; see also infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
93. Lindley H. Clark, Jr., Financial Services: Regulation’s Revival, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1990, at
A1.
94. Economic Implications of the “Too Big to Fail” Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Econ. Stabilization of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 36, 37 (1991)
(statement of Johnny C. Finch, Dir. of Planning & Reporting, Gen. Accounting Office). At the time,
some in Congress viewed FDIC insurance as reducing market discipline. Id. at 66–67 (statement of
Rep. Thomas R. Carper, Chairman, Subcomm. on Econ. Stabilization & Comm. on Banking, Fin. &
Urban Affairs).
95. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
96. In the late 1960s, Congress enacted the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).
Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (2006)). SIPA
established the private, nonprofit Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) that
administers a fund to protect the accounts of securities investors. See id. SIPC protects investors from
losses due to broker-dealer failure. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities
Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1071,
1074 (1999). Since its inception, SIPC membership grew rapidly, but so did broker-dealer failures due
to “depressed securities markets, speculation in the new issue market, bookkeeping problems,
inadequate capital, mismanagement, poor supervision of subordinates, and fraud.” Harold S.
Bloomenthal & Donald Salcito, Customer Protection from Brokerage Failures: The Securities Investor
Protection Corporation and the SEC, 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 161, 162 (1983); see also Michael E. Don &
Josephine Wang, Stockbroker Liquidations Under the Securities Investor Protection Act and Their
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encouraged acquisitions of weak financial institutions by stronger
98
organizations. Indeed the “failing firm” doctrine enabled many financial
institutions to acquire financial institutions that they otherwise would
99
have been unable to acquire for either regulatory or antitrust reasons.
When merger partners could not be found for Continental Illinois, a
troubled major bank in 1984, the financial regulators bought the bad
100
debt, thus giving rise to the too-big-to-fail doctrine. Being saved by the
federal government did not prevent Continental Illinois from making
further business errors. During the week of the 1987 stock market crash,
it was forced to make a $620 million capital infusion into First Options of
Chicago, Inc., a Continental Illinois subsidiary that was a major clearing
101
firm for options makers on the Chicago Board Options Exchange.
Finally, this too-big-to-fail bank was acquired by Bank of America in
1994, relieving the banking regulators of the burden of further
102
overseeing this troublesome organization. Ironically, one of the reasons
the Fed saved Continental Illinois was because of the potential domino
103
effect of its failure on other banks, including Bank of America.
The banking crises of the 1980s, coupled with further deregulation
of banking, led to the growth of ever bigger regional and national banks

Impact on Securities Transfers, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 509, 510–12 (1990). As of the 2009 fiscal year,
SIPC had 4956 members across the various national exchanges. 2009 SIPC Ann. Rep. 8.
97. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) was created as part of the
National Housing Act of 1934 in order to insure deposits in S&Ls. See ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1750g (1988)). FSLIC administered deposit insurance for S&Ls. See
id. §§ 402–403, 48 Stat. at 1256–58. By 1984, over 30% of all FSLIC insured institutions were operating
at a loss. See Markham, supra note 38, at 245. Financially troubled S&Ls raised concerns that FSLIC
would not have sufficient funds to pay insured deposits. Id. at 246. Still, the S&L industry lost some $7
billion in 1987. Id. Over 1000 S&Ls closed down by 1988. Id. As a result, the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 abolished FSLIC and replaced it with the Savings
Association Insurance Fund, which is administered by the FDIC. Id. at 247; see Pub. L. 101-73, 103
Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)).
98. See Zabihollah Rezaee, Financial Institutions, Valuations, Mergers, and Acquisitions:
The Fair Value Approach 15–16 (2001).
99. See id. (explaining that well-capitalized banks acquired weaker banks, partially because
regulators look favorably upon the efficiency and high capital ratios of the stronger banks); Markham,
supra note 38, at 245 n.151 (noting that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board encouraged mergers
among S&Ls); see also Melanie Fein, Securities Activities of Banks, 1-44 to 1-44.2 (2011) (listing
major acquisitions). It is noteworthy that acquisition by a stronger competitor is markedly different
from acquisition by a regulator in the “too-big-to-fail” scenario. See Foster, supra note 6, at 52. Both
arguably may lead to off-loading of toxic assets, improved balance sheets, and, hopefully, economic
benefit for stakeholders and shareholder. Since there are fewer sizable competitors to absorb sizable
organizations, mergers and acquisitions result in banks that are too-big-to-fail. See Foster, supra note
6, at 52.
100. Foster, supra note 6, at 51; see also supra notes 12 & 18 and accompanying text.
101. Dennis P. O’Connell, Reviewing the Year: The Top 5 Stories, Am. Banker, Dec. 28, 1987, at 5.
102. Barry Ritholtz & Aaron Task, Bailout Nation: How Greed and Easy Money Corrupted
Wall Street and Shook the World Economy 218 (2009).
103. 1 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience 548
(1998).
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and of the mega-financial institution holding company. As the stronger
banks went on a shopping spree, a new type of bank entered the scene in
105
the 1990s: the super-regional bank. The self-perpetuating dynamic led
to stronger banks getting bigger and stronger, as the number of smaller
local banks shrunk. The emerging regional banks outpaced the extant
106
regulatory framework. Mergers and acquisitions reduced the number
107
of banks from around 14,000 in 1980 to fewer than 10,000 in 1995.
Similarly, as the barriers between investment banking and commercial
banking continued to erode, further deregulation promoted “one stop
108
financial shopping at banks and bank holding companies.”
Further, as the country was lurching toward the complete
dismantling of Glass-Steagall and other Depression-era constraints on
banks and investment banks, a series of financial crises challenged
financial regulators and led to the preservation of the new paradigm of
mega-financial institutions dominating capital markets, ensuring their
global competitiveness. These crises included the stock market crash of
109
1987, which became known as “Black Monday,” the stock market crash
110
111
of 1989, the Latin American debt crisis of 1980s, the Asian debt crisis
112
113
of the 1990s, the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, and

104. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 82–87.
105. They included Banc One Corporation, First Chicago/NBD Corporation, Fleet Financial,
Norwest Corporation, CoreStates, First Union, Wachovia Corporation, Wells Fargo, and
NationsBank. Markham, supra note 38, at 256; see John Spiegel et al., How Superregional
Powerhouses Are Reshaping Financial Services, at xiii (1996). These regional banks also were a
response to the way in which the ban on interstate banking became eroded by regional interstate
banking compacts. See supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text.
106. Spiegel et al., supra note 105; see Peter C. Carstensen, Public Policy Toward Interstate Bank
Mergers: The Case for Concern, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1397, 1415–18 (1989).
107. Spiegel et al., supra note 105.
108. See Markham, supra note 38, at 260 (quoting David R. Satin, Breaking Down the Wall: The
Unofficial End of Glass-Steagall, Bank Sec. J., July–Aug. 1997, at 11, 11) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
109. Annelena Lobb, Looking Back at Black Monday: A Discussion with Richard Sylla, Wall. St.
J. (Oct. 15, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119212671947456234.html. It is noteworthy that the
Black Monday crash was arguably the early warning signal of the recent May 6, 2010 flash crash. The
price fluctuation aspects of both crashes ultimately were blamed on excessive and rapid automated
computer trading. See id.
110. See Robert Shiller, Exuberant Reporting: Media and Misinformation in the Markets, 23 Harv.
Int’l Rev. 60, 63 (2001). The stock market crash that occurred on Friday, October 13, 1989 is widely
believed to have been caused by a reaction to a news story of the breakdown of a $6.75 billion
leveraged buyout deal for UAL Corporation, the parent company of United Airlines. See id.
(discussing but ultimately disagreeing with this position).
111. The Latin American debt crisis occurred in the early 1980s, when Latin American countries
reached a point where their foreign debt exceeded their earning power, and they were not able to
repay it. See Markham, supra note 38, at 242. Mexico’s announcement that it could not meet its debt
obligations were followed by defaults in Brazil, Argentina, and more than twenty other countries. See
id. at 242 & n.128. The largest American banks had Latin American loans on their books that
amounted to nearly 50% of their capital. See id.
112. See generally The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications, And Solutions (William
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the bursting of the technology stock market bubble in the 1990s. These
crises were caused in part by explicit and implicit government
guarantees. Impeded by a credibility deficit and capital flight, developing
countries were unable to manage the crisis. They turned to the
International Monetary Fund and the Fed, which intervened to protect
115
the creditor banks that kept credit flowing. The loans to Mexico, for
example, and subsequent packages to the Asian crisis countries, were
116
perceived to be a bailout. Indeed, crisis prevention in the form of a
financial safety net, such as virtually universal deposit insurance, planted
117
the seeds for another crisis. The anticipation of a government bailout
would create moral hazard and imprudent lending during subsequent
118
years. Thus, the doctrine of too-big-to-fail was to play a major role in
the Fed’s policy in the coming decade. In 1999, reacting to the mounting
political pressure from banking giants, Congress repealed Glass119
Steagall. This final deregulation of Depression-era financial regulation
resulted in a further consolidation of financial services, because banks
could now freely form financial holding companies that could engage in a

Curt Hunter et al. eds., 1999). On October 27, 1997, the Dow Jones industrial plunged 554 points or
7.2%, amid ongoing worries about the Asian economies. The New York Stock Exchange briefly
suspended trading. Div. of Mkt. Regulation, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Trading Analysis of October 27
and 28, 1997 (2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/tradrep.htm. The crisis led to a drop in consumer
and spending confidence. See id. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision would eventually note
that East Asian financial institutions, prior to the crisis, “took on excessive risk, in part due to implicit
government guarantees.” Gary H. Stern & Ron J. Feldman, Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank
Bailouts 28 (2004) (quoting Rudi Bonte et al., Bank for Int’l Settlements, Supervisory Lessons to Be
Drawn from the Asian Crisis 57 (Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision Working Paper No. 2, 1999)).
113. Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) was a U.S. hedge fund which used trading
strategies such as fixed income arbitrage, statistical arbitrage, and pairs trading, combined with high
leverage. Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World 193–95 (2007).
It failed spectacularly in the late 1990s, leading to a massive bailout by other major banks and
investment houses, which was supervised by the Fed. Id. One of the mega-banks that emerged from
this crisis was Bank of America, which had taken a major hit when Russian bonds defaulted and was
then acquired by NationsBank and renamed BankAmerica. The resulting entity had combined assets
of $570 billion and 4800 branches in twenty-two states. R. Christian Bruce & Eileen Canning,
NationsBank-BankAmerica Deal Clears; Merger Creates Largest U.S. Bank Firm, Daily Rep. Exec.
(BNA) No. 159, at A-9 (Aug. 18, 1998). Despite this large size, federal regulators insisted only upon
the divestiture of thirteen branches in New Mexico. Id.; Business Brief—NationsBankCorp.:Federal
Reserve Approves Merger With BankAmerica, Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1998, at 1.
114. Stephen E. Frank & E.S. Browning, Bursting of the Tech Bubble Has a Familiar “Pop” to It,
Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at C1.
115. See Wilmarth, supra note 73, at 224–25.
116. See generally Ian Vasquez, A Retrospective on the Mexican Bailout, 21 Cato J. 545 (2002).
117. See id.
118. Id. at 308–09.
119. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act),, Pub. L. No. 106102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). The Act was signed by President William Jefferson Clinton on Nov. 12,
1999. See Markham, supra note 38, at 263–64; see also Michael Schroeder, Congress Passes FinancialServices Bill, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1999, at A2.
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120

broad array of financial services. Gramm-Leach-Bliley broadly defined
the modern functional regulatory framework that remains in place today,
121
as embellished by Dodd-Frank.
The merger of Travelers Group with Citicorp, the parent company
of Citibank, in April 1998, challenged what remained of Glass-Steagall
before Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Although Citigroup was given two years to
divest any prohibited assets, aggressive lobbying by former Secretary of
the Treasury Robert Rubin and the heads of Citicorp persuaded
122
Congress to instead pass Gramm-Leach-Bliley. At this time, Citicorp
was the world’s largest supplier of credit cards, and Citibank was the
123
second largest bank in the United States. When it acquired Travelers, it
became a financial supermarket: a one-stop shop for insurance,
124
investment banking, brokerage, and other financial services. One
commentator has called this “the moment when Citi went from being a
125
very large bank to becoming an unmanageable Goliath.”
The decade following the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley witnessed
both bank failures and continued contraction among financial services
firms. According to the FDIC’s Failed Bank List, 283 banks closed from
126
2000 to 2010. These banks were local, less well-capitalized banks; their
127
ranks included commercial banks, investment banks, and S&Ls. Credit
128
Unions around the country were also impacted, and many closed. The
first decade of the twenty-first century continued to witness contraction
among financial institutions across the U.S. In order to deal with the
collapse of large firms, regulators encouraged financial institutions to
acquire firms that they otherwise would have been unable to acquire for
129
either regulatory or antitrust reasons.

120. See Markham, supra note 38, at 263; see also Michael Schroeder, Glass-Steagall Compromise
Is Reached, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1999, at A2.
121. Commercial banking activities are regulated by the bank regulators, while securities activities
are regulated by the SEC and state securities commissions. Commodity futures and options activities
are regulated by the CFTC, and insurance activities are regulated by multiple state insurance
regulators. Markham, supra note 38, at 264.
122. Ritholtz, supra note 102, at 213–14.
123. See id. at 212.
124. See Markham, supra note 38, at 262–63.
125. See Ritholtz, supra note 102, at 212.
126. Failed Bank List, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/
banklist.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
127. Id.
128. The National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) does not have a table of failed credit
unions prior to 2009, but a list of credit unions that failed between 2009 and 2010 can be found on the
NCUA’s website. Closed Credit Unions 2010, Nat’l Credit Union Admin., http://www.ncua.gov/
Resources/ClosedCU/2010.aspx#top (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). For failed credit unions prior to 2009,
see the NCUA press releases regarding failed credit unions. Press Releases 2011, Nat’l Credit Union
Admin., http://www.ncua.gov/NewsPublications/News/PressRelease.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
129. In 2007, Bank of America absorbed Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, increasing its assets from
$1.7 trillion to $2.3 trillion. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 180. JPMorgan Chase absorbed
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The Fed dealt with continuous deregulation in the face of banking
and stock market crises by keeping interest rates low, encouraging the
use of derivatives, and allowing the growth of financial holding
130
companies. During the financial crisis of 2008, the Fed allowed and
encouraged further mergers until only a baker’s dozen of large U.S.
131
financial institutions were left standing. Other financial regulators
cooperated in these matters by protecting their turf through the policy of
functional regulation. The problem was that financial holding companies
became huge, out-of-control hydras, that were “too-big-to-manage” and
132
“too-big-to-discipline adequately.” Liabilities were pushed off the
133
balance sheets of regulated entities into unregulated entities, often
abroad and beyond the reach of U.S. regulators.
Dodd-Frank has some features that, at least at the margins, ought to
make for better regulation of financial firms by curbing excesses,
134
promoting discipline, and increasing oversight. Although the statute
gives regulators the power to design new rules, other provisions merely
135
authorize regulators to study certain issues. An independent consumer
protection agency has been created within the Fed, but many of its
powers are a transfer of authority already existing at the Fed or other
136
agencies. Other measures include creation of a systemic risk regulator,
greater transparency and stability in derivatives trading, improved
regulation of credit-rating agencies, and a partial ban on proprietary
137
trading by banks. Nevertheless, Dodd-Frank accomplished a successful

Bear Sterns and Washington Mutual, growing from $1.6 to $2 trillion. Id. Wells Fargo absorbed
Wachovia and nearly doubled its assets. Id. In order for the deals to go through, Bank of America,
JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo had to be exempted from a federal rule prohibiting any single bank from
holding more than 10% of all deposits in the country, as well as from Department of Justice antitrust
guidelines. Id.
130. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and
the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 963, 975–76 (2009); see also Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 56 (2011).
131. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 180; Edward R. Herlihy et al., Convergence,
Consolidation, Consternation and Complexity in an Industry in Transition: An Annual Review of
Leading Developments, in Financial Institutions M&A 2009, at 267 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Ser. No. 24859, 2010). See generally Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The
Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System from
Crisis—and Themselves (2009).
132. These terms have been used to describe mega-banks throughout the history of the too-big-tofail doctrine. See Wilmarth, supra note 73, at 290 n.311.
133. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 86; Kara Scannell & Carrick Mollenkamp, SEC
Homes in on Lehman, “Funds of Funds”, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 2010, at C1.
134. See infra notes 252–74 and accompanying text.
135. Eleanor Laise, Congress Overhauls Your Portfolio, Wall St. J., July 17–18, 2010, at B7.
136. Id.
137. Randall Smith et al., Impact to Reach Beyond Wall Street, Wall St. J., July 16, 2010, at A4.
With respect to hedge funds and derivatives, the bill authorizes the SEC and the CFTC to regulate
derivatives jointly. Id. Derivative trades will run through clearing houses and exchanges, and hedge
funds and private-equity firms must register with the SEC. See Laise, supra note 135. Also, companies

Karmel_62-HLJ-821 (Do Not Delete)

March 2011]

4/16/2011 1:08 PM

BREAKING UP THE BANKS

843

grab for more power by regulators who had set the stage for the financial
meltdown by acceding to the creation of highly leveraged mega-banks.
Furthermore, Congress has not addressed the basic economic problems
that led to the meltdown, such as an overblown and speculative real
138
estate market and enormous budget and trade deficits. Observers,
commentators, and even regulators share the concern that the true
139
nature of the country’s financial problems has not been addressed.

III. The PUHCA as a Model for Dealing with the Mega-Banks
The PUHCA was a special regulatory program designed to break up
the public utility holding companies according to antitrust principles, but
with a view toward restructuring rather than destroying the holding
companies. There are some surprising similarities between the public
that sell products like mortgage-backed securities must hold a stake in the instruments they sell. Id.
With respect to bank regulation, the Fed has obtained more responsibility for big financial firms. Id.
The Volcker Rule now prevents banks from trading with their own capital to some extent. Further, the
new Bureau of Consumer Finance will have its own budget independent from the Fed. C. Boyden
Gray, Wall Street Reform That Flouts the Law, Wash. Post, Dec. 31, 2010, at A17. To deal with the
next bubble, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “Council”) will search for and identify
systemic risks. Id. The Treasury obtained a new Office of Financial Research to collect data and
investigate potential systemic issues. Id. Credit rating agencies will now be regulated by a dedicated
office at the SEC. Id.
138. See Editorial, The Truth About the Deficit, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 2010 (Week in Review) at 9;
David Leonhardt, Bubblenomics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2008, (Week in Review), at 1; David E. Sanger
& Mark Landler, Obama Faces Calls for Rules on Finances, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2009, at A1.
139. The current framework allows for “regulatory arbitrage,” in which participants in the market
can exploit the gaps in the multi-regulator system. “A trend toward something as questionable as
subprime mortgages can easily develop because there are too many cooks, too many supervisors and
no one is really coordinating.” John Poirier, Mortgage Woes Spotlight Bank Regulation, Reuters, Dec.
7, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/12/07/us-usa-subprime-bankregulationidUSN0738500720071207 (quoting Michael Malloy, a former senior attorney of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency) (internal quotation marks omitted). In February 2008, FDIC Chairman
Sheila Bair urged that in the future, “the home mortgage market needs strong rules.” Sheila C. Bair,
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks at the Joint Venture Silicon Valley Network State of the
Valley Conference (Feb. 22, 2008), transcript available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/
archives/2008/chairman/spfeb2208.html; see also, e.g., Les Leopold, Why the Wall Street-BP Double
Standard?, The Huffington Post (June 25, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/les-leopold/why-dowe-treat-wall-stre_b_625286.html (noting that, unlike BP during the Gulf oil spill, Wall Street is
getting off for the havoc it wreaked on the American economy); Richard Posner, Abuse of Presidential
Power?, The Becker-Posner Blog (July 17, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2010/
07/abuse-of-presidential-power-posner.html (focusing primarily on the Obama administration’s
purportedly expansive view of presidential authority, and noting that the recent financial legislation
does not resolve anything). The Economist also noted:
Indeed, the new consumer bureau potentially creates another monster. Nor does it tackle
the future status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to the chagrin of Republicans, who rightly
view the two mammoth mortgage agencies as having played a leading role in causing the
financial crisis. The final document may run close to 2,000 pages, but some very important
issues are being left for another day.
A Successful All-Nighter, The Economist Online (Jun 25th 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
newsbook/2010/06/americas_financial_reforms_agreed.
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utility holding companies of the 1920s and today’s big bank holding
companies, especially with regard to their complexity and political
power. One solution to the systemic threat posed by the too-big-to-fail
banks is to compel their restructuring by a regulatory agency according
to a model based on the PUHCA.
A. The Antitrust Model
Are banks and other financial institutions that are too-big-to-fail in
fact too big to be? One solution that has been suggested for the too-bigto-fail problem is the consideration of systemic risk in the antitrust
analysis with a view to breaking up the big banks pursuant to section 2 of
140
141
the Sherman Act or section 7 of the Clayton Act. This is an appealing
idea, because it involves the application of existing law to the problem of
curtailing the size and power of the oligopoly of large financial
institutions. Even if the political will could be found to embark on such a
course, however, it would involve years of adversarial litigation with an
142
uncertain prospect for success. Historically, even when the Department
of Justice has been determined to take on Wall Street, it has been mostly
143
unsuccessful in the cases it has brought. Yet, despite this lack of success
in the courts, where a Department of Justice antitrust policy has been
able to enlist the cooperation and support of the SEC or Congress, its
144
views have prevailed.

140. Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209, 209–10 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006 & Supp.
III 2009)).
141. Foster, supra note 6, at 53–61; see Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 28 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006)). See generally William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L.
Rev. 1105 (1989).
142. In 1948, the Fed issued a complaint against Transamerica, the holding company of Bank of
America, for violating the Clayton Act, which prohibits a corporation from acquiring the stock of a
corporation that substantially lessened competition or created a monopoly. Marquis James & Bessie
Rowland James, Biography of a Bank: The Story of Bank of America N.T. & S.A. 501 (1954). In
1952, after almost two years of hearings, the Fed ordered Transamerica to divest all of its subsidiary
banks and dispose of all of its stock in Bank of America. Id. But the Fed’s action was overturned by
the court of appeals, which held that the Fed had failed to prove its monopoly charges against
Transamerica. Id. at 501–15.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (exemplifying one of the
biggest antitrust cases in history, against Wall Street underwriters, which did not lead to a conviction).
144. In the battle to unfix stock exchange commission rates, the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division joined a suit against the New York Stock Exchange in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,
but this assault failed, because the Supreme Court held that the SEC could exercise direct and active
supervision of rate fixing. 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975). Yet, the SEC and Congress mandated the unfixing
of rates in 1975. See Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29, § 6(e)(1), 89 Stat. 97, (1975).
Similarly, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division joined with the SEC to eliminate the oneeighth trading convention in securities. National Association of Securities Dealers, Exchange Act
Release No. 37,538, 49 SEC Docket 1346 (Aug. 8, 1996).
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In the 1930s, a specialized antitrust program was brought against the
public utility holding companies, fingered as culprits in the 1929 stock
market crash, by the PUHCA. Although the PUHCA was passed in
145
1935, it was not fully implemented until the 1950s, due to the intense
opposition of the public utility companies, including court actions aimed
146
at invalidating the statute. Yet, once the mandate of the statute was
accepted by the judiciary, and the industry understood that the SEC had
the power to restructure the public utilities, the SEC succeeded in doing
147
so with the cooperation of the industry. The story of the PUHCA is an
interesting one of an unusual and successful New Deal program that
targeted a troublesome oligopoly, and one which could possibly serve as
a model for future efforts to constrain mega-banks. Just as the antitrust
laws would have to be applied globally to be utilized against the big
148
banks, a PUHCA-type effort to rationalize financial institution holding
companies would have to be implemented in cooperation with
international regulators. This might not be impossible, given that at least
one key regulator abroad in the United Kingdom has looked at the
problems of global financial weaknesses through the lens of the unwieldy
149
size of banks. Furthermore, the European Union is about to impose
much stricter controls on risk-taking compensation structures in financial
150
firms than the United States has even considered.
B. The Holding Company Structure
Traditional corporate law viewed every corporation as a separate
151
Until the end of the nineteenth century, one
juridical entity.
152
corporation could not own shares in another corporation. This doctrine
changed in 1890, when New Jersey—then a leading state for the
development of corporate law—permitted the acquisition and formation

145. Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 79–79(z)-6 (2000)), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463
(2005).
146. Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal 218–19 (1970).
147. Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance 257 (3d ed. 2003).
148. Foster, supra note 6, at 61–64.
149. David Shay Corbett II, Free Markets and Government Regulation, 14 N.C. Banking Inst. 547,
552–53 (2010); see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 209–10.
150. Commission Report on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to
Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, COM
(2010) 243 final (May 27, 2010); Stephen Fidler & Alessandro Torello, Europe to Limit Banker
Bonuses, Wall St. J., July 8, 2010, at A1; Elena Logutenkova, EU Investment Banks May Be Hurt by
New Pay Rules, JP Morgan Says, Bloomberg (Jan. 18, 2011, 3:24 AM) http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-01-18/eu-investment-banks-may-be-hurt-by-new-pay-rules-jpmorgan-says.html.
151. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent
and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 295, 297 (1996).
152. Id.
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of subsidiaries without any statutory authorization. After that time,
holding companies grew in a number of key industries. This change in
corporate structures was recognized in a number of New Deal regulatory
programs based on the recognition of enterprise principles, so that
statutory imperatives applied not only to particular regulated entities,
154
but also to persons controlling or controlled by them. The PUHCA was
the first major federal statute to concentrate its provisions on the holding
company. In particular, this statute dealt with the abuses and insolvencies
of the country’s utilities.
Between 1900 and 1930, improved generating equipment and other
engineering advances led to the growth of interstate, rather than merely
155
local, electric transmission. This technological advance led to the
development of large holding companies with diversified and
156
geographically-dispersed subsidiaries. Through the use of leverage, a
holding company with a small investment in the voting securities of
various subsidiaries could gain control over a huge complex of
157
companies. Engineering, construction and financial companies were
often housed in one system, in which the holding company earned
158
These holding
income from dividends and management fees.
companies became extraordinarily complex. For example, by 1932, the
159
Associated Gas and Electric system had 264 corporate entities.
Further, these giant utilities gobbled up independent operating
companies. In 1914, there were eighty-five systems controlling two-thirds
of the country’s private electric power output. By 1929, sixteen holding
160
company groups controlled 92% of the country’s output.
The utility holding company was able to grow so large and
complicated because it had certain advantages over other companies. A
large holding company could secure capital on favorable terms,
coordinate investment decisions based on engineering considerations
rather than according to political boundaries, and attract and cultivate a
161
larger pool of engineering talent. However, the unsound financial

153. Id. at 298.
154. Id. at 304.
155. Parrish, supra note 146, at 145–50.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 147.
158. Id. at 146–47.
159. Id. at 148.
160. Id. at 149. The most famous of the public utility holding companies were those controlled by
Samuel Insull, a self-made businessman, who started his career working as Thomas Edison’s secretary,
and who ended his career defending himself in a criminal prosecution after the bankruptcy of his
holding company during the Depression. For an interesting description of Insull’s rise and fall, and a
comparison of Insull to Enron, see Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to
Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 Energy L.J. 35
(2005).
161. James C. Bonbright, Public Utilities and the National Power Policies 23–24 (1940).
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practices of these companies undermined these organizations and
neutralized their advantages in comparison to isolated operating
162
companies. The public utility holding companies were complicated to a
degree almost beyond comprehension. According to Ferdinand Pecora,
“the Insull structure was so complex that no one could fully grasp it, not
163
even, probably, Mr. Insull himself.”
Like the public utility holding companies, financial holding
companies have become large, complex, opaque and highly risky, in large
part through the use of leverage. One could certainly conclude that the
complexity and risks of their operations were not understood by their top
officers and directors, or they would not have been allowed to spin out of
164
control to the brink of extinction. Also like the public utility holding
companies, financial holding companies developed new products through
financial engineering, made possible by technology, geographic
165
expansion, and deregulation. Banks and investment banks previously
engaged in segmented aspects of the financial industry combined. These
financial services holding companies had better access to capital than
smaller specialized firms, were able to expand internationally, and had
166
access to talented and entrepreneurial workers. But they utilized offbalance sheet accounting to create leverage, and they invented financial
167
instruments to spread risk that managed to create even greater risk.
These holding companies became so complicated and opaque that the
risks they were assuming threatened them and other firms, and without
federal assistance many of them would have failed, possibly bringing
168
down the financial system.
C. The History and Purpose of the PUHCA
The restructuring of the public utility industry has been called “the
SEC’s most useful accomplishment,” and also “by far the most difficult
169
to attain.” The PUHCA was directed at dismantling the public utility
holding company oligopoly as described in a 101-volume study by the
162. Id. at 24–26.
163. Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 160, at 94 (quoting Ferdinand Pecora, Wall Street
Under Oath: The Story of Our Modern Money Changers 224–25 (1939)).
164. The mega-banks probably are too big and multifaceted to manage. See Grant, supra note 73,
at 397–410 (describing the size and complexity of Citigroup and Bank of America); see also Ritholtz,
supra note 102, at 212.
165. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 963, 980–97 (2009).
166. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 82–85.
167. See id. at 74–87; Wilmarth, supra note 165, at 1027–35.
168. In October 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
providing $700 million to the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (“TARP”) to buy up toxic assets from
systemically important financial institutions. See Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). Instead of
doing so, the government made direct investments into these firms.
169. Seligman, supra note 147, at 127.
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and an investigation by the House
170
Subject to state
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.
regulation, electric and gas utilities were inherently local or regional in
171
As a result, these businesses did not posses
their operations.
172
organizational economies of scale on a national basis. During the 1920s,
however, holding companies sought to build giant utility empires by
purchasing various utility properties around the country. These empires
173
grew quickly during the 1930s. By 1932, holding companies controlled
174
the majority of the electric and gas utilities in the U.S. Thirteen large
groups controlled 75% of the entire privately-owned electric utility
175
industry. Three holding companies (J.P. Morgan’s United Corporation,
Samuel Insull’s holding company empire, and the Electric Bond and
Share Company) generated 45% of the electricity in the United States,
and four holding companies controlled more than 56% of the natural gas
176
transportation system. In addition to the power of these holding
companies over rates, a number of evils in the operation of the holding
177
companies provided an impetus for reform.

170. See 1 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 230 (3d ed. 1989).
171. 6 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 18.1, at 440 (6th ed.
2009). See generally Bonbright, supra note 161; Martin T. Farris & Roy J. Sampson, Public Utilities:
Regulation, Management, and Ownership (1973); Martin G. Glaeser, Public Utilities in
American Capitalism (1957).
172. 6 Hazen, supra note 171. See generally Bonbright, supra note 161; Farris & Sampson, supra
note 171; Glaeser, supra note 171.
173. 6 Hazen, supra note 171. See generally Bonbright, supra note 161; Farris & Sampson, supra
note 171; Glaeser, supra note 171.
174. 6 Hazen, supra note 171. See generally Bonbright, supra note 161; Farris & Sampson, supra
note 171; Glaeser, supra note 171.
175. S. Rep. No. 74-621, at 55 (1935).
176. Seligman, supra note 147, at 127. In 1939, there were fifty-one separate public utility systems,
comprising 142 registered holding companies subject to SEC regulation, with aggregate assets in
excess of $14 billion. 5 SEC Ann. Rep. 63 (1939). In 1986, there were twelve active public utility
holding companies. 1986 SEC Ann. Rep. 156. These twelve registered holding company systems had
sixty-five electric or gas utility subsidiaries, seventy-four non-utility subsidiaries, and twenty-two
inactive subsidiaries. Id. By 1999, the number of public holding companies registered under the Act
had increased to nineteen. 1999 SEC Ann. Rep. 62. These nineteen “registered systems were
comprised of 107 public utility subsidiaries, 70 exempt wholesale generators, 216 foreign utility
companies, 606 non-utility subsidiaries, and 110 inactive subsidiaries, for a total of 1128 companies and
systems with utility operations in 31 states.” Id. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the
number of registered publicly utility holding companies grew slowly. As of September 2002, there
were twenty-eight registered public utility holding company systems and a total of sixty-four public
utility holding companies. 2002 SEC Ann. Rep. 65.
177. Nidhi Thakar, The Urge to Merge: A Look at the Repeal of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 903, 910 (2008). Further, the Roosevelt
administration was interested in local and government ownership of utilities, and President Roosevelt
believed that holding companies needed to be eliminated from the public utility business. Id. The
President viewed holding companies as “private socialism of concentrated private power.” Id.; see also
Seligman, supra note 147, at 129 (quoting Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, The PUHCA’s
Gone, What Is Next for Holding Companies?, 27 Energy L.J. 1, 3 (2006)).
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It was not only the size and geographic breadth of the utilities that
disturbed policymakers, but also their unsound corporate structures and
178
practices. Federal regulators found the abuses adversely affected the
179
interests of the American public as investors and consumers. Among
the evils uncovered were inflationary write-ups on the books of the
operating companies, acquisitions of properties at inflated valuations, the
financing of corporate expansions by issuing excessive amounts of senior
securities and insufficient amounts of common stock (leading to
excessive leverage and inequitable capital structures), giving favorable
treatment to investment bankers, and the extraction of excessive
180
dividends and fees. A study by the FTC also noted that inappropriate
partial bargaining between holding companies and their subsidiaries led
to the imposition of excessive charges upon the operating subsidiaries;
the allocation of charges from service, management, construction, and
other contracts among subsidiary public utilities in different states,
causing problems of regulation for any individual state; the complication
of state regulation of subsidiaries through the exercise of control over
subsidiary business policies; the use of inadequate equity investments to
exert control over operating subsidiaries; and the extension of holding
company systems without regard to operational, integration, and
181
business logistics.
Further, the holding company structure led to financial imbalances.
Control of the utilities was accomplished by leverage, in that the holding
companies held voting common stock, but the real equity was held by the
182
public in the form of nonvoting preferred stock and debt securities.
Although this type of leverage made for high valuations during the boom
of the 1920s, excessive debt-to-equity ratios were the principal cause of

178. Section 1(b) of the Act sets out some of the abuses: inadequate disclosure to investors of the
information necessary to appraise the “financial position or earning power” of the holding company;
the issuance of securities “without the approval or consent of the States having jurisdiction over
subsidiary public-utility companies”; the issuance of securities “upon the basis of fictitious or unsound
asset values . . . and upon the basis of paper profits from intercompany transactions, or in anticipation
of excessive revenues from subsidiary public-utility companies;” and the overcapitalization of
operating subsidiaries, thus increasing fixed charges and “tend[ing] to prevent voluntary rate
reductions.” Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, § 1(b), 49 Stat. 803, 803–04 (1935) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (2000)), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 (2005);
see also 6 Hazen, supra note 171.
179. § 1(b), 49 Stat. at 803–04; see also 6 Hazen, supra note 171.
180. See 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 170, at 230–31.
181. § 1(b), 49 Stat. at 803–04; see also 6 Hazen, supra note 171. The public utility systems became
complex and overcapitalized systems. 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1, at 441. Often beyond the power
of any single state regulators, abuse of their complex structures led many holding companies into
bankruptcies and caused tremendous losses for investors. See 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 86 (1944).
182. See 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 170, at 232.
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the bankruptcies of many utility holding companies during the bust of
183
the 1930s.
The general purposes of the PUHCA were to strengthen the capital
184
structure of holding companies by increasing the ratio of equity to debt,
to return control to local regulators and managers, and to improve their
185
A bitter and prolonged legislative battle
corporate governance.
preceded the enactment of the PUHCA, and after the statute was passed,
186
the industry refused to comply. The most important public utilities did
not even register with the SEC but instead tested the constitutionality of
187
the legislation. However, careful legal maneuvering by the SEC
avoided a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional, and in time,
changes in the composition of the Supreme Court made such a
188
declaration unlikely. Yet, the SEC was not able to fully implement the
189
statute until the Truman administration.
D. Overview of the PUHCA
The PUHCA was primarily concerned with regulation rather than
disclosure. It required all holding companies with subsidiaries engaged in
the electric utility business or in the retail distribution of natural or
190
manufactured gas to register with the SEC. Thereafter, the holding
company became subject to two principal provisions. Section 11

183. See Seligman, supra note 147, at 128.
184. According to the SEC, “a balanced capital structure with a substantial amount of common
stock equity . . . provides a considerable measure of insurance against bankruptcy[,] enables the utility
to raise new money most economically, and avoids the possibility of deterioration in service to
consumers if there is a decline in earnings.” 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 72 (1944).
185. 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1, at 441. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 address the securities markets generally and thus were ill-equipped to deal with
problems peculiar to the public utilities industry. Id. Above and beyond the Acts, the PUHCA was
intended “to compel the simplification of public-utility holding-company systems . . . .” See § 1(b), 49
Stat. at 804. The fundamental purpose of the PUHCA was to “free utility operating companies from
the absentee control of holding companies, thus allowing them to be more effectively regulated by the
states.” 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1, at 441. According to Hazen, the following sources are
illustrative:
North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 704 (1946) (by compelling holding companies to
“integrate and coordinate their systems and to divest themselves of security holdings of
geographically and economically unrelated properties . . . Congress hoped to rejuvenate
local utility management and to restore effective state regulation.”); Alabama Elec. Co-op.,
Inc. v. SEC, 353 F.2d 905, 9 (D.C. Cir.1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 968 (1966) (“The purpose
of Public Utility Holding Company Act . . . was to supplement state regulation—not to
supplant it.”).
6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1, at 441 n.14.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See Parrish, supra note 146, at 219.
See id. at 219–20.
See Seligman, supra note 147, at 132–38.
Id. at 257.
§ 5, 49 Stat. at 812–14.
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mandated geographical integration and corporate simplification, and
other sections regulated the financing and operation of the holding
192
company system, including transactions with affiliates. The SEC’s
authority to review a holding company’s financial structure included the
regulation of intercompany loans, the payment of dividends, sale of
assets, proxy solicitations, and service, sales, and construction
193
contracts. Very importantly, the SEC approved securities issuances and
acquisitions according to a merit review regime, in addition to a
194
disclosure based review. Intracompany transfers were limited. The evil
of a powerful oligopoly having an undue influence on political policy was
recognized and controlled. The financial promotion of any candidate for
195
public office or the support of any political party was prohibited.
The SEC had the authority to determine what constituted a
196
“holding company,” “subsidiary,” or “affiliate” subject to the PUHCA.
197
The standard utilized by the SEC was 10% voting stock ownership.
Because the main objective of the PUHCA was to achieve a balanced
capital structure for utilities, the most important provision of the
PUHCA gave the SEC the power to cause a holding company to
eliminate more than two tiers of holding companies in any holding
198
company complex. Further, the SEC could restructure a holding
company whenever necessary “to ensure that the corporate structure or
continued existence of any company in the holding company system does
not unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure, or unfairly or
199
inequitably distribute voting power among security holders . . . .”
The PUHCA has been described as “the most ambitious legislation
of the depression-inspired federal attack on concentrated economic

191. Id. § 11. This section was sometimes called the “death sentence,” because it put an end to the
holding companies as they previously existed. See Thakar, supra note 177, at 912.
192. See §§ 5, 6, 49 Stat. at 812–14; Douglas W. Hawes, Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935—Fossil or Foil?, 30 Vand. L. Rev. 605, 608 (1977); see also Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303
U.S. 419, 442–43 (1938) (holding the registration provisions of the PUHCA constitutional); N. Am.
Co. v. SEC, 133 F.2d 148 (2d Cir.1943), aff’d, 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
193. See §§ 12(a)–(e), 13(a), 49 Stat. at 823–25.
194. See 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 170, at 240–43.
195. Id. at 240–41.
196. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. SEC, 166 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948); Phillips v. SEC, 153 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1946).
197. Blumberg, supra note 151, at 305. This was a much lower number than the concept of control
in other statutes. For example, the Bank Holding Company Act and the Savings and Loan Holding
Company Act utilize 25% as the standard, although implementing administrative regulations go down
to as low as 5% and 10%. Id.
198. Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, PUHCA’s Gone: What Is Next for Holding
Companies?, 27 Energy L.J. 1, 7 (2006).
199. Public Utility Holding Company Act, § 11(b)(2), 49 Stat. 803, 821 (1935) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79–79(z)-6 (2000)), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–
16463 (2005).
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power.” Although the SEC had the authority to integrate and simplify
the structure of the holding companies, the agency accomplished the
restructuring of the utility industry by inducing the utilities to propose
acceptable divestiture and simplification plans. It did so not only by
interpreting some provisions of the statute in an uncompromising way
and litigating its interpretations, but also by utilizing exceptions and
201
giving rewards to companies that completed voluntary proceedings.
These rewards were to increase the value of both preferred and common
stock in reorganization proceedings. The financial structure of both
202
holding companies and operating companies was strengthened.
Although the SEC was forced to compromise with the utilities in order to
achieve the PUHCA’s objectives, the agency’s geographic integration of
the utilities and their corporate simplification was “the most
comprehensive structural relief ever achieved by an agency of the federal
government. The SEC’s enforcement . . . also was an illustration of the
203
advantages of the process.”
E. Geographical Integration and Corporate Simplification
In order to strengthen the capital structures of holding company
systems and to bring the utilities industry back under the control of local
management and local regulation, the SEC had to examine the corporate
204
structures of holding companies and their subsidiaries. The SEC had to
determine “the extent to which their corporate structures could be
simplified, or their voting power redistributed, and whether their
properties and businesses were restricted to those necessary or
205
appropriate to the operations of an integrated public utility system.”
206
The PUHCA’s geographical integration provision was its “very heart.”
It required that each holding company system be limited to a single
integrated electric or gas utility system, and to such other businesses as
were reasonably incidental, or economically necessary or appropriate, to
207
the operations of the system. The term “integrated public utility

200. Seligman, supra note 147, at 247 & 794–95 n.22 (quoting Ronald Finlayson, The Public Utility
Holding Company Under Federal Regulation, J. Bus., July 1946, at 11, 11) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
201. James W. Moeller, Requiem for the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: The “Old”
Federalism and State Regulation of Inter-State Holding Companies, 17 Energy L.J. 343, 350 (1996); see
Seligman, supra note 147, at 254.
202. Melnyk & Lamb, supra note 198.
203. Seligman, supra note 147, at 263.
204. See § 11(a), 49 Stat. at 820.
205. See 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.4.
206. SEC v. New England Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. 176, 180 (1966) (quoting N. Am. Co. v. SEC,
327 U.S. 686, 704 n.14 (1946)).
207. § 11(b)(1), 49 Stat. at 820–21.
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system” contemplated a group of naturally-related properties within a
208
209
single area or region with respect to both electric and gas companies.
A single “integrated public utility system” could not include both
210
gas and electric properties. But a holding company had the right to
continue to control one or more additional public utility systems,
whether gas or electric, if the SEC, among other things, found that each
such additional system could not be operated as an independent system
211
without the loss of “substantial economies,” and that all such additional
systems were located in one state or in adjoining states, or in a
212
contiguous foreign country. As a precondition, the SEC also had to
find that the continued combination of such systems under the control of
a single holding company was not so large as to adversely affect the
advantages of localized management, the efficiency of operations, or the
effectiveness of regulation. For a holding company to continue control of
one or more additional integrated public utility systems, all of the above
213
conditions would have to be met. The retention of an additional
214
integrated system was very rare. Only if the SEC found that it was
“necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors or consumers and not detrimental to the proper functioning of
215
such system or systems,” could a holding company retain an interest in a
216
functionally related non-utility business.
208. See Nat’l Rural Elec. Co-op. Ass’n v. SEC, 276 F.3d 609, 610–11 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 15
U.S.C. §§ 79j(c)(1), 79k(b)(1), 79b(a)(29)(A) and vacating the SEC’s decision to approve a merger
involving two geographically distant companies); see also 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.4.
209. See § 2(a)(29), 49 Stat. at 810.
210. Phila. Co. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 720, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 8 S.E.C.
443, 462 (1941). This prohibition of utilities with both gas and electric divisions was later relaxed and
eventually all but abandoned. See 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.5.
211. See § 11(b)(1)(A), 49 Stat. at 820; New England Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. at 179; Phila. Co., 28
S.E.C. 35, 46 (1948), aff’d sub nom. Phila. Co. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see also City of
New Orleans v. SEC, 969 F.2d 1163, 1167–68 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
212. § 11(b)(1)(B), 49 Stat. at 820. See Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 936, 941–42 (D.C.
Cir. 1943) (“[Within an integrated public utility system, all] additional systems [had to be] located in
the same state with the principal system, or in adjoining states, or in a contiguous foreign country.”),
vacated as moot, 332 U.S. 788 (1947).
213. Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co., 138 F.2d at 941; see also Envtl. Action, Inc. v. SEC, 895 F.2d 1255, 1263
(9th Cir. 1990); N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 133 F.2d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 1943), aff’d, 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
214. New England Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. at 180.
215. N. Am. Co., 133 F.2d at 152 (quoting section 11) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co., 138 F.2d at 947. But see Phila. Co., 177 F.2d at 726 (quoting N. Am. Co. v. SEC,
327 U.S. 686 (1946)).
216. For a number of decisions relating such a finding, see Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. SEC,
170 F.2d 453, 462–63 (8th Cir. 1948) (pipeline construction); Columbia Gas Sys., Public Utility Holding
Company Act Release No. 35-21895, 21 SEC Docket 1480 (Jan. 23, 1981) (gas by-products); Sys. Fuels
Inc., Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 21367, 19 SEC Docket 103 (Dec. 28, 1979)
(uranium); Ohio Power Co., Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 21173, 18 SEC Docket
15 (Aug. 3, 1979) (railcar repair facilities); Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., Public Utility Holding
Company Act Release No. 20561, 1978 WL 196975 (May 26, 1978) (lending for purpose of installing
insulation); New England Elec. Sys., Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 18635, 5 SEC
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Importantly, the PUHCA also required corporate simplification. It
mandated elimination of corporate layers that complicated the structure of
the holding company system. The unduly complicated structure caused the
distribution of voting power among the system’s security holders to be
218
unfair or inequitable. The SEC was required to take whatever action was
necessary to ensure that holding companies ceased to be holding
companies with respect to any subsidiaries having their own subsidiaries
219
that were also holding companies. However, the SEC could not regulate
the corporate structure of any company that was not a holding company,
or whose principal business was that of a public utility operating
220
company, except to ensure fair and equitable distribution of voting
221
power among the shareholders of such a company.
An order of the SEC directing a registered holding company to
simplify its corporate structure was required to be complied with within
222
one year. If the holding company refused to comply voluntarily, the SEC
223
could enforce the order in a U.S. district court. Because Congress
intended for holding company systems to comply with the PUHCA
224
voluntarily, the SEC’s orders “normally declared only that [a] particular
holding company or subsidiary . . . reclassify its securities, . . . divest certain
holdings, or liquidate, without specifying how this was to be
225
226
accomplished.” Companies could file their own plan of compliance.
Even in reorganization proceedings, the PUHCA was not intended to
227
cause forced liquidation of securities.

Docket 372 (Oct. 30, 1974) (oil and gas exploration); Middle S. Utils., Public Utility Holding Company
Act Release No. 185547, 5 SEC Docket 102 (Sept. 5, 1974) (refineries); N. Am. Co., 29 S.E.C. 521, 533
(1949) (coal properties); Cities Servs. Gas Co., 15 S.E.C. 962, 969 (1944) (production and transmission
facilities); Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co., 12 S.E.C. 41 (1942) (merchandising of appliances). For examples of
businesses that have not been found to be functionally related, see Pennzoil Co., 43 S.E.C. 709, 719
(1968) (electrical instruments); N. New England Co., 20 S.E.C. 832, 842–44 (1945) (pulpwood); N. Am.
Co., 11 S.E.C. 194, 226 (1942) (land development).
217. See § 11(b)(2), 49 Stat. at 821.
218. See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1946) (noting evidence was
sufficient to support finding that two subsidiary companies unduly and unnecessarily complicate a
holding company’s system); Wis.’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. SEC, 882 F.2d 523, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(finding a holding company’s acquisition of a public utility did not unnecessarily complicate corporate
structure of utility). See generally Leo W. Leary, “Fair and Equitable” Distribution of Voting Power
Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (1953).
219. § 11(b)(2), 49 Stat. at 821.; see, e.g., Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 626 (1945).
220. See § 11(b)(2), 49 Stat. at 821.
221. 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1.
222. See § 11(c), 49 Stat. at 821.
223. Id. § 11(d).
224. 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 65 (1944).
225. 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.4.
226. § 11(e), 49 Stat. at 822. The SEC could approve the plan if it found the plan to be necessary to
effectuate the provisions of subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected. Id.
227. N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 709 (1946); In re Elec. Bond & Share Co., 73 F. Supp. 426,
449 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). In fact, reorganization plans under section 11(e) frequently provided for
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In addition to reducing the concentration of economic power in the
utilities industry, the PUHCA had several beneficial effects upon
investors, consumers, and utility companies. Operating companies became
228
financially stronger and more responsive. Investors began to buy
securities in public utility companies. These investments were more
accurately valued. Investors began receiving previously unseen dividends
229
and other cash payments.
F.

Continued Operation and Regulation

Geographical and corporate simplification requirements led many
holding companies to self-liquidate. But the PUHCA did not intend
230
elimination of all holding companies. The PUHCA “prescribe[d]
standards for the continued operation of compact, well-integrated
231
systems,” regulated by the SEC. The provisions of the PUHCA that
232
continued to apply related to the issuance of securities and to the
233
acquisition of securities, utility assets, and other interests. The PUHCA
234
235
also addressed intercompany transactions, reporting requirements,
236
and standards for accounting and record keeping. In line with other
federal securities laws, the PUHCA imposed liability for materially
237
misleading statements and prohibited certain activities by corporate
238
insiders, including insider trading.
239
Acquisitions also were regulated. The SEC would not approve
acquisitions of interests in another business if: (1) the acquisition led to
interlocking relations or a concentration of control that was detrimental
240
to investors or consumers, (2) the consideration to be paid in connection
241
with such acquisition was unreasonable or unfair, or (3) the “acquisition

alternative methods of compliance. See 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 65 (1944). The SEC had to evaluate
whether corporate reorganization plans were fair and equitable. See id. The SEC mainly sought to
ensure that reorganization did not result in the destruction of values or in the taking of investment
interest. Id.
228. See authorities cited supra note 171.
229. See 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 65–66 (1944).
230. 15 SEC Ann. Rep. 95 (1949).
231. Id.
232. Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, §§ 6, 7, 49 Stat. 803, 814–17 (1935) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (2000)), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 (2005)
(requiring a “declaration” containing the types of information required by 1933 Act registration).
233. §§ 8–10, 49 Stat. at 817–20.
234. Id. §§ 12, 13.
235. Id. § 14.
236. Id. § 15; see also 17 C.F.R. pt. 256 (2004).
237. § 16, 49 Stat. at 829–30.
238. Id. § 17.
239. Id. § 10.
240. Id. § 10(b)(1); see e.g., Tex. Utils. Co., 1 S.E.C. 944, 952 (1936).
241. § 10(b)(2), 49 Stat. at 819; see, e.g., Ohio Power Co., 44 S.E.C. 340, 346 (1970) (approving
acquisition upon finding that the consideration had fair relation to the sums invested or the earnings
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[would] unduly complicate the capital structure of the holding company
system . . . or [would] be detrimental to the public interest or the interest
of investors or consumers or the proper functioning of such holding242
company system.” The SEC had to make specific findings that the
transaction would “serve the public interest by tending towards the
economical and the efficient development of an integrated public-utility
243
system.”
244
By the end of the century, many holding companies operated
under exemptions from registration that continued “unless and except”
the SEC found the exemption detrimental to the public interest or to the
245
interest of investors or consumers. Thus, exempt holding companies
were indirectly regulated by the exemption, as they risked losing the
exemption if they purchased a significant nonutility business not
246
functionally related to the operation of the utility system.
The PUHCA had subjected an entire industry sector to close
scrutiny by a federal regulator. This was an unprecedented and successful
experiment in America’s economic history. While the PUHCA solution
may be viewed as a product of its time, it worked effectively, and there is
no reason a similar approach could not work again. This Article
hypothesizes that certain aspects of the PUHCA model, for example a
version of the corporate simplification framework, could be transplanted
and utilized in an industry, such as financial mega-conglomerates, whose
condition and symptoms resemble those that plagued the public utilities
in 1930s.
G. How a PUHCA Solution Could Be Applied to the Banks
The New Deal regulatory response to the problems of banking was
similar in many respects to the New Deal regulatory response to public
utility and common carrier regulation: “The essential features of [these
regulatory systems] were entry control, price control, market allocation
through the forced separation of commercial banking from investment
banking and securities activities, and close supervision of investments

capacity of the properties and that the amount was arrived at after arm’s length bargaining); see also
6 Hazen, supra note 171.
242. § 10(b)(3), 49 Stat. at 819; see, e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 10 S.E.C. 1091, 1091 (1942).
243. § 10(c)(2), 49 Stat. at 819; Am. Gas & Elec. Co., 22 S.E.C. 808, 810 (1946); see, e.g., Envtl.
Action, Inc. v. SEC, 895 F.2d 1255, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding the SEC’s approval of an asset
acquisition in the face of a challenge by retail customers of one of the holding company’s subsidiaries).
244. 1993 SEC Ann. Rep. 44. In 1986, there were thirteen registered holding companies. 1986 SEC
Ann. Rep. 156.
245. Brian C. Elmer & Mark E. Mazo, Utility Takeovers and the Holding Company Act, Pub.
Util. Fort., Sept. 30, 1982, at 17, 17. Ninety-one holding companies had exemptions from registration
as of June 1982. Id.
246. See H.R. Rep. No. 1318, at 14–15 (1935); see also authorities cited supra note 171.
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247

and related activities.” One significant difference was the creation of
248
the FDIC. Although FDIC insurance undoubtedly prevented bank
runs and assured the stability of banks for a long period of time, it also
led to the too-big-to-fail principle that is now so questionable and
controversial. The need to protect the deposit insurance fund also led to
the creation of mega-banks.
It is not possible to go back to the economy of the 1930s, and the
New Deal philosophy of protecting business through regulations that
proved anti-competitive was discredited during the deregulatory decades
of 1980 to 2010. Perhaps, however, in the aftermath of the financial
meltdown of 2008, it is time to discredit the ideology of deregulation and
return to some of the ideas of the 1930s. Uncontrolled competition in
free markets led to the collapse of the financial system and enormous
destruction in the real economy. The problems of the decade from 2000
to 2010, like the problems of the 1920s, were too much leverage in the
financial system, too much complexity in the banking and investment
banking systems, and the creation of holding company structures that
249
Furthermore, despite all of the financial
proved unmanageable.
regulation that continued to exist, functional regulation meant that no
agency had regulatory oversight and control over subsidiaries of holding
companies that sheltered off-balance sheet liabilities and threatened the
viability of their parents and regulated entities. Legislation that would
rationalize holding company structures, and make these organizations
simpler and more transparent could therefore be of value.
A statute, analogous to the PUHCA, that rationalizes the corporate
structure and operations of the financial services industry and eliminates
conflicts of interest between banking and other activities would be a
novel but effective antidote to the functional regulation that sowed the
seeds for the financial crisis of 2008. Although the Fed will now have
oversight of systemically significant institutions and a council composed
of all of the financial regulators, headed by the Treasury, will be
250
formed, Dodd-Frank sets forth no comprehensive plan for controlling
the size or complexity of the mega-banks. Some new ideas for curtailing
risk through corporate structural reform were considered by Congress in
the 2010 financial reform debates—specifically, concentration and
growth limits for systemically important firms, moving derivatives trading
251
to subsidiaries, and the Volcker Rule. Unfortunately, these ideas have

247. Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 Va. L.
Rev. 301, 303 (1987).
248. Id. at 302–03.
249. See John Kay, We Should All Have a Say in How Banks Are Reformed, Fin. Times, June 16,
2010, at 13.
250. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1002, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955–64 (2010).
251. See Sewell Chan, Financial Debate Renews Scrutiny on Size of Banks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21,
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been watered down to the point where they may not be a meaningful
curb on risky activities by the largest banks or prevent further
concentration in the financial sphere.
Under Dodd-Frank, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the
“Council”) is required to identify systemically important nonbank
252
financial companies and then to make recommendations to the Fed
concerning the establishment of prudential standards and reporting and
253
disclosure requirements. Bank holding companies with $50 billion or
more in assets are automatically subject to enhanced prudential
254
standards. Large investment-banking holding companies will be subject
255
to Fed supervision. If the Fed finds a systemically important company
poses a grave threat to financial stability, with the approval of two-thirds
of the members of the Council, the Fed must take action to mitigate the
256
risk. Such action could include limiting the ability of the company to
merge with or otherwise become affiliated with another company,
restricting offers of a financial product, ordering termination of activities
or imposing restrictions on such activities, or requiring the company to
sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-balance sheet items to unaffiliated
257
entities.
More drastic curtailment of concentration and growth limits has
been left either to studies or to future Fed rulemaking. Six months after
the passage of Dodd-Frank, the Council must complete a study on the
prohibition on acquisitions by firms where the total assets of the resulting
258
company would exceed 10% of aggregate U.S. liabilities. Within nine
months of the Council’s study, the Fed must issue rules limiting merger
and acquisition transactions that would result in a company holding
greater than 10% of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial
259
companies. The Fed is instructed to issue concentration limits for large
interconnected bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in

2010, at A-1; John Gapper, Volcker Has the Measure of the Banks, Fin. Times, Jan. 28, 2010, at 15;
Gretchen Morgenson, Do You Have Any Reforms in Size XL?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2010, (Sunday
Business), at 1; Paul Volcker, How to Reform Our Financial System, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 2010,
(Sunday Opinion), at 11.
252. Nonbank financial companies are any company other than a bank holding company
predominantly engaged in financial activities, which means that 85% or more of the company’s and its
subsidiaries’ consolidated annual gross revenues or consolidated total assets are attributable to
activities that are financial in nature. § 102(a)(4)(B), (a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1391–92.
253. Id. § 112(a)(2)(I).
254. Id. § 165(a)(1)(A).
255. Id. § 113(a)(1), (b)(1). During the 2008 crisis, the largest broker-dealer holding companies
were either acquired by banks or became bank holding companies. See supra note 129 and
accompanying text.
256. § 121(a), 124 Stat. at 1410–11.
257. Id.
258. Id. sec. 622, § 14(b), (e).
259. Id. sec. 622, § 14(e).
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260

assets and for systemically important nonbank financial companies.
Among other things, these rules must prohibit such companies from
having credit exposure to any unaffiliated company that exceeds 25% of
261
the capital stock and surplus of the company.
262
from
The Volcker Rule prohibits any “banking entity”
“engag[ing] in proprietary trading[,] . . . or acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any
equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a
263
hedge fund or private equity fund.” In the course of the negotiations
for this legislation, the Volcker Rule became subject to many exceptions,
including purchases or sales of any security in connection with
underwriting or market-making activities, risk-mitigating hedging
activities, and purchases or sales of any security or other instrument on
264
behalf of customers. Further, a bank may sponsor a private equity or
hedge fund under certain conditions and maintain a 3% interest in the
265
fund. As initially proposed, the Volcker Rule was designed to control
the conflicts of interest and risk generated by the trading activities of
banks that led to the meltdown. It was viewed by its proponent as a mini266
Glass-Steagall. Dodd-Frank, as enacted, does not really accomplish this
task. The Council is directed within six months after the enactment of
Dodd-Frank to complete a study and make recommendations to
267
implement the Volcker Rule, but it can be anticipated that the same
lobbying activities that led to the watering down of the Rule will occur in
268
this process.
A proposal to force all banks to conduct derivatives trading in a
269
subsidiary was considered when the legislation was under consideration,
260. Id. § 165(a).
261. See id. § 165(e)(2).
262. “Banking entity” is defined as any insured depository institution, any company that controls
such an institution, or any company that is treated as a bank holding company under the International
Banking Act. Id. sec. 619, § 13(h)(1).
263. Id. sec. 619, § 13(a)(1).
264. Id. sec. 619(d), § 13(d).
265. See id. It is uncertain how rigorously this provision will be enforced or whether banks will
believe they need to come to the rescue of a hedge fund sold to their customers that gets into financial
difficulty. The decision by Bear Stearns to financially support two hedge funds that it had sponsored
was the beginning of that firm’s death spiral. See William D. Cohan, House of Cards 362–71 (2009).
This is the gist of the problem in the regulation of holding company subsidiaries. Instead of serving as
a source of strength, they have served to seriously weaken their parents. See supra notes 12 & 18 and
notes 100–03 and accompanying text (regarding Continental Illinois’ problems during the 1987 stock
market crash).
266. Louis Uchitelle, Volcker, Loud and Clear, N.Y. Times, July 11, 2010, (Sunday Business), at 1.
267. Sec. 619, § 13(d)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1623.
268. See Daniel Indiviglio, 5 Ways Lobbyists Influenced the Dodd-Frank Bill, Atlantic (July
5, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/07/5-ways-lobbyists-influenced-the-dodd-frankbill/59137/; Aaron Lucchetti & Jenny Strasburg, What’s a “Prop” Trader Now?, Wall St. J., July 6,
2010, at C1.
269. See Letter from Thomas Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, to Senator
Blanche Lincoln, Sen. of Ark. (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/10/
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but the final version of Dodd-Frank is not as draconian as initially
envisioned. Nevertheless, two of the mega-banks have exited from
270
derivatives proprietary trading in response to Dodd-Frank. There is a
push out of swap dealers and major swap participants from banks, but
these provisions do not apply to an insured depository institution
engaged in hedging or risk mitigation activities directly related to its
271
business. Moreover, the statute expressly permits an insured depository
institution to enter into swaps involving rates, currencies, or any other
assets that are permissible investments for national banks, including
272
investment grade certificates of deposit. Additionally, any bank or
bank holding company is prohibited from becoming a swaps entity
except in compliance with standards to be set by its prudential
273
regulator, unless such activities are conducted by a bank affiliate
274
supervised by the Fed.
Whether risky trading or other activities are conducted in a bank or
in the subsidiary of a financial holding company is not the real issue. If
the subsidiary is hiding the liabilities of the parent, or is out of control in
terms of risk, the parent will be punished by the market if the subsidiary
fails. Although Congress can prohibit the use of federal funds to save the
subsidiary, the reality of the marketplace is that such a mandate does not
275
matter. Although appropriate capital charges can mitigate this type of
risk, the only way to assure that a holding company subsidiary does not
sink the parent is to spin off the subsidiary. Alternatively, subsidiaries
engaged in risky businesses can be relegated to organizations which do
not have deposit or other similar government insurance.
Although securities firms enjoy insurance from the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation for customer funds and securities in the
safekeeping of the firms, they are not allowed to use these customer
assets as capital in the conduct of their business. Rather, such assets are
276
segregated. Therefore, when Drexel Burnham Lambert failed in 1990,

thomas-hoenig-derivatives-banks_n_608297.html; see also Edward Wyatt, In Tough Stance, Democrat
Finds Few Allies, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2010, at A16.
270. See Jerry A. DiColo, With Big Banks Forced to Exit, Look for Speculators to Step In, Wall
St. J., Sept. 7, 2010, at C10.
271. § 716(d), 124 Stat. at 1648–49.
272. Id. § 716(d)(2).
273. Id.
274. Id. at § 716(c).
275. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
276. In 1970, to compliment SIPC, the SEC enacted Rule 15c3-3, “to ease the particular tracing
requirements of prior law so as to expand the definition of specifically identifiable property which
remains outside the single and separate fund and is ‘reclaimable’ by customers in kind.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-3 (2010). Pursuant to the rule,
[A] broker-dealer must have possession or control of all fully-paid or excess margin
securities held for the account of customers, and determine daily that it is in compliance
with this requirement. The broker-dealer must also make periodic computations to
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no customer funds or securities were lost, and the parent went into
277
bankruptcy. “The 152 year-old [firm] with 5,300 employees and $3.6
billion in assets” was at the center of the debt-propelled takeover market
278
of the 1980s. Nevertheless, “[i]n Washington the Government’s top
economic team stood by with folded arms and watched the company
279
fail.” Further, “[w]hile Congress [was] eager to investigate debacles
like Drexel’s, it [showed] little interest in enacting new laws to curb
280
financial markets, even after the 1987 crash.”
Twenty years later, partly as a result of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, banks
and investment banks had numerous subsidiaries in a wide variety of
businesses, as did American International Group (“AIG”), an insurance
holding company. It was not the business of banking that brought these
firms to the brink of collapse. Rather, it was trading bets on and
investments in securitized subprime mortgages and derivatives, including
credit default swaps. Many of these businesses were conducted in non281
banking subsidiaries. The holding company parent was not properly
supervised, and subsidiaries with very risky businesses were allowed to
operate under the umbrella of firms with federal deposit insurance. Even
worse, the federal financial regulators decided that the mega-firms were
so interconnected that even an organization like AIG, which was
282
essentially an insurance company, had to be bailed out. Mega-banks
strongly opposed pushing out derivatives to subsidiaries—as proposed in
early versions of Dodd-Frank—because such a move requires devoting
more capital to those businesses. However, even this regulatory change is
insufficient to prevent the kind of problems that led to the 2008
meltdown. The problem in 2008, as in 1987, was excessive leverage. The
concentration and complexity of the mega-banks simply made matters

determine how much money it is holding that is either customer money or obtained from
the use of customer securities. If this amount exceeds the amount that it is owed by
customers or by other broker-dealers relating to customer transactions, the broker-dealer
must deposit the excess into a special reserve bank account for the exclusive benefit of
customers. This rule thus prevents a broker-dealer from using customer funds to finance its
business.
Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 2008), http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm.
277. Kurt Eichenwald, Drexel, Symbol of Wall St. Era, Is Dismantling; Bankruptcy Filed, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1990, at A1.
278. John Greenwald, Predator’s Fall: Drexel Burnham Lambert, Time, Feb. 26, 1990, at 46, 46.
279. Id. at 50.
280. Id.
281. The AIG unit that was at the center of the financial crisis was an unregulated subsidiary of an
insurance holding company. See Sorkin, supra note 131, at 154–55, 160, 394–95.
282. AIG did own a trust company subsidiary, and so it was overseen by the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the one regulator that will be eliminated in Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521–23 (2010).
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worse, so that the government’s top economic team no longer believed it
could stand by and watch firms fail.

Conclusion
Much of the implementation of Dodd-Frank has been left to the
various functional regulators of financial institutions, and some of the
more controversial proposed provisions have been relegated to studies.
While the statute has many salutary provisions and is clearly an
improvement over the existing regulatory system in many respects, it
does not change the balkanized nature of the financial regulatory
universe. Neither does it curtail the leverage inherent in derivatives
283
trading. Further, it does not reduce the size or complexity of the
existing mega-banks. Thus far, there has been no political will to
radically change the regulatory system or the composition of the banking
industry. This is not surprising, since many of the same players who
engaged in the deregulatory policies of the last three decades are still in
284
power. Another financial crisis, a prolonged recession, or changing
political ideologies could cause a reexamination of the status quo and
lead to decisions to break up the big banks. If that should happen,
policymakers could well take another look at the PUHCA as model for
doing so.
Since 1980, policymakers have believed that government regulation
is problematic, free market competition is an unquestioned good,
financial engineering should be encouraged, and we need not worry if
financial enterprise eclipses industrial enterprise. These mantras are now
being reconsidered. This reconsideration should lead to a more
responsible balance between government, finance, and industry, but the
poisonous partisanship that has prevailed in Washington in recent years
does not give much hope of a sensible resolution of the country’s
economic problems. Dodd-Frank, despite its length and complexity,
should serve as only the beginning to financial regulatory reform. Yet, in
view of the intense opposition of the financial industry and the political
theatrics of an election year, it is surprising that any reform legislation
was enacted at all.
Financial regulators have now been tasked with conducting
hundreds of studies and adopting myriad rules to implement DoddFrank. Will they cooperate or engage in further turf battles? In their
efforts to avoid further bailouts of too-big-to-fail financial organizations,
283. I have previously criticized the unwillingness of financial regulators to deal with the excessive
leverage derivatives have injected into the financial markets. Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds,
Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 909, 935–41 (2005); see also 1987
Market Break, supra note 15, at 3-19 to 3-22.
284. Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 208.
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will they work to make the mega-banks smaller, less opaque, and less
complex? At one time, evasion of financial regulation was considered
wrong, but during the deregulatory push of the last three decades,
mechanisms to evade statutory and regulatory restraints on financial
institutions were invented by clever bankers and their lawyers and
sanctioned by financial regulators. One of the by-products of overly
complex business and legal systems, this unhealthy syndrome of finding
285
ways around laws and regulations should be discredited and changed.
Dodd-Frank is a continuation of such prolix complexity. Will financial
regulators be sufficiently strong and statesman-like to avoid even more
complicated regulations as they implement this legislation?
Financial crises have always followed similar patterns. Excessive
leverage and speculation blow up a financial bubble that eventually
bursts. The bigger the bubble, the greater the wreckage when the party
ends. Ordinary Americans have lost their jobs, their homes, and their
savings. It is not surprising that they increasingly distrust the elites in
Washington and on Wall Street that cooperated in creating the biggest
bubble and the greatest bust since the 1920s and 1930s. It is going to take
much more dramatic and radical action to restore the public’s confidence
in the government and in the capital markets than Dodd-Frank has
accomplished. While a twenty-first century New Deal may not be the
answer to today’s problems, it is at least worth considering which New
Deal statutes did accomplish good goals and how these accomplishments
were achieved. The PUHCA was one of those statutes.
Let me end on a cautionary note, however. The PUHCA remained
on the books long after its goals were accomplished. I was a
286
Commissioner of the SEC during the Three Mile Island disaster, and
one of my concerns was whether the PUHCA was in any way responsible
for the problems of Three Mile Island. It is quite possible that the
electrical utility industry had become too stodgy, and too entrenched, in
part because of the PUHCA. Furthermore, it is possible that nuclear
power plants like Three Mile Island were starved of necessary capital
because utilities were unable to grow sufficiently to raise the amounts of
capital needed in an economy more complicated than that of the 1930s.
Furthermore, the idea that there should be a market in electrical utility
production and the growth and implosion of Enron might have been one
285. See Patrick Jenkins, Banks Seek to Exploit New Rules, Fin. Times, Apr. 12, 2010, at 17.
286. On March 28, 1979, the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in
Middletown, Pennsylvania was the most serious nuclear power plant accident in American history.
This generating station was constructed by General Public Utilities Corporation (later renamed GPU
Incorporated), a public utility holding company registered with the SEC. See Fact Sheet, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident (Aug. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html; see also Gerald Huesken, Jr.,
The Legacy of Three Mile Island, Examiner.com (Dec. 2, 2010, 8;13 PM), http://www.examiner.com/
history-in-harrisburg/the-legacy-of-three-mile-island.
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unwelcome side effect of the continuation of the PUHCA beyond the
time when it should have been sunset.
Accordingly, while I believe that the mega-banks need to be broken
up and rationalized, and that deposit insurance and other government
guarantees should not be allowed to support activities that are not part of
the function of intermediation, any antitrust type of effort to reduce
banks to a manageable size should not continue indefinitely. The capital
markets are always in a state of flux, and we should aim to tame but not
destroy the creative forces that drive the economy’s engine.
Nevertheless, the continued uncontrolled growth of a leveraged trading
culture inside the banking system is a prescription for further financial
volatility and turmoil that will not have a happy ending.

